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I. Introduction
Over the course of the last decade the present author has consistently asserted that United
States federal government procurement law may most usefully be understood by reference to a
spectrum running between polar opposite approaches labeled “exceptionalism” and
“congruence.” “Exceptionalism,” as I initially defined it, is the idea that “because of its
sovereign status, unique functions, and special responsibilities, the United States Government as
a contracting party is not subject to all of the legal obligations and liabilities of private
contracting parties.”1 The opposing norm of “congruence” embodies “the tendency to construe
the obligations and liabilities of the United States Government under its contracts to conform to
those of private parties under purely private agreements.”2 In short, this spectrum gauges the
degree to which aspects of federal public procurement law diverge from the rules of private
contract law that govern comparable issues and does so in respects that favor the government of
the United States.3
1

Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism in
Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO . WASH . L. REV . 633, 637 (1996)(hereinafter Liability for
Sovereign Acts). See also Joshua I. Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal of
Congruence in Government Contracts Law, 26 PUB. CON . L. J. 481, 489-492 (1997) (hereinafter
Assembling Winstar); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability
Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1177, 1192-1193 & n. 61
(2000) (hereinafter Wake of Winstar); Joshua I. Schwartz, Learning from the United States’
Procurement Law Experience: On “Law Transfer” and Its Limitations, 11 PUB. PROC. L. REV .
115, 117-118 (2002) (hereinafter Learning from the United States’ Procurement Experience.) .
2
3

Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1, at 490

In my own work, at least, these constructs have not been deployed to gauge the degree to
which the public contracts law of the States of the United States depart from the norms of their
private contract law. That undertaking is certainly worthwhile, however. For readers without a
background in United States law, it is important to emphasize here that the body of public
procurement law described in this Article as “United States Federal Public Procurement Law”
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The author has argued, further, that the Supreme Court of the United States has never
recognized, much less resolved, the tension between the exceptionalist and congruence
approaches both found within the corpus of the United States federal government contract law.4
Nonetheless, from an analytical point of view, the contrast between these opposing tendencies
provides a key organizing construct – indeed, I have suggested, perhaps, the central construct –
for the study and understanding of United States government contracts law.5 In addition,
although the exceptionalism/congruence spectrum initially was proposed as a device for
understanding United States public procurement law in a purely domestic context, the utility of

governs only the transactions entered into by the federal –that is the national– government of the
United States. Moreover, the States are essentially free to frame their own procurement law
systems and they need not track a single model in doing so. Thus, further research could
demonstrate variation in the degree to which the States adhere to an exceptionalist or
congruence-oriented approach.
It may be particularly worthwhile to undertake the extension of these concepts to
representative examples of state procurement law systems, precisely because the United States
Constitution does not allow the States any significant military procurement role. Accordingly,
the absence of military procurement from the development of state procurement systems might
have affected their approach to issues of exceptionalism and congruence in a manner that would
shed further light on the thesis advanced in this Article. As noted below, this but one of the
suggestions for further research that emerges from the present study. See infra TAN ___.
4

This is the essential thesis of Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1. See especially,
id. at 637-638, 650-651, 697-702. Despite language in a plurality opinion in the Winstar case
(518 U.S. 839 (1996)) that might be thought to side decisively with the norm of congruence, the
author has argued in subsequent articles that neither the Supreme Court’s decision in that case (in
which there was no majority opinion), nor subsequent developments in this field of law, have in
fact significantly alleviated this tension, nor even recognized the conflict in the existing law.
Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1, passim; Schwartz, Wake of Winstar, supra note 1,
passim
5

Joshua I. Schwartz, CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A SURVEY OF GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT LAW 43-45 (desktop published, Fall 2004 ed.) (hereinafter “PROCUREMENT LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS”).
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this construct in comparative law contexts has also been recognized. The author has invoked this
construct as a tool for exploring the development of public procurement law in developing
nations, and in addressing the problem of transferability of “best practices” for public
procurement from developed nations to developing nations.6
It is time to take a closer look at the phenomenon of exceptionalism that characterizes so
much of United States public procurement law. The examination undertaken here has several
important dimensions.
The first element, is to delineate more precisely the incidence and scope of the
exceptionalist tendency that I have identified in United States government contracts law. On
closer examination, it is discernible that this exceptionalist tendency is primarily, though not
exclusively, manifested in doctrines concerning the performance, rather than the formation of
United States government contracts.7 There certainly are aspects of the law of public contract
formation that might be labeled “exceptionalist” in the sense that they represent departures from
the norms of private contract law in the area of contract formation. On examination, however,
these, for the most part, are doctrines that impose additional obligations and duties on the

6

118.
7

Learning from the United States’ Procurement Law Experience, supra note 1, at 117-

The law of government contract formation, in the United States, addresses the processes
by which contracting opportunities are publicized, the criteria for contract award, processes for
the selection of the appropriate contractor, and the availability of “bid protest” litigation in
judicial and administrative forums to challenge a governmental agency’s choice of contractor.
The law of government contract performance, in the United States, governs problems that arise
during the performance of the contract, including the resolution of disputes in administrative and
judicial forums. The distinction between the law of government contract formation and the law
of government contract performance is the central organizing dichotomy that governs the
teaching of federal government contracts law in the United States.
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government with respect to contract formation, obligations that are not shared by private
contracting parties. The paradigmatic example of such special obligations is the duty to secure
full and open competition in awarding most government contracts and the procedural
requirements that implement this overriding duty.8 By contrast, departures from the norms and
rules of private contract law in the area of federal public contract performance law, generally
entail either 1) special immunities that reduce or eliminate the liability of the United States for
conduct that might be deemed a breach of contract were it committed by a party to a private
sector contract, or 2) powers allowed to the United States to alter its own contracts that would
render a private contract void on the ground that it is illusory or unsupported by consideration. It
is this “negative” form of exceptionalism that reduces the government’s obligations or expands
its powers vis a vis contractors that more properly defines what the author has labeled the
exceptionalist tendency in the United States public procurement law system.9 By contrast the
8
9

See infra TAN ___-___.

Previously, in a somewhat different, but still relevant context, the present author has
employed this nomenclature of “exceptionalism” to describe both the reasoning behind and the
practical operation of the Supreme Court’s administrative law cases that immunize the
government from operation of the private law doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Joshua I.
Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for An
Agency's Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN . L. REV . 653, 664
(1992) (hereinafter “The Irresistible Force”). That earlier work identified as a central weakness
of this body of law the fact that the Court was attuned exclusively to the special obligations and
responsibilities of the government, and the special requirements of relevant Constitutional texts,
that tended to justify shielding it from the duties and liabilities applicable to private parties,
labeling this approach “negative exceptionalism.” Id. at 664-668. At the same time, The
Irresistible Force argued, the Court was inappropriately oblivious to factors and doctrines –such
as the Due Process Clause of the Constitution--that might suggest that the United States
government enjoys special responsibilities toward those with whom it engages that are not shared
by private parties. Id. at 726-742. The approach suggested by the latter branch of my argument in
The Irresistible Force promotes “positive exceptionalism” as that term is employed here.
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reverse phenomenon, positive departures from the norms of private contract law that impose
extra obligations on the United States in contracting, especially in the public contract formation
process, the author will label “reverse exceptionalsim.”
In order to substantiate the present author’s first major hypothesis– that this
phenomenon defined here as “exceptionalism” is primarily associated with the United States’ law
of government contract performance – this Article presents a survey, identifying many of the
most telling examples of exceptionalism in the operation of the United States’ public
procurement law. These examples cluster quite strikingly in the area of government contract
performance rules. By contrast, our doctrinal survey will confirm that the law of government
contract formation also departs from the norms of the law of private contracts, for instance by
requiring full and open competition and specifying mandatory procedures to ensure achievement
of that objective. However, as suggested above, the survey also confirms that these departures
are primarily such as to impose additional duties and obligations on the government, rather than
to limit its liabilities or lend it atypical powers. Thus United States law of public contract
formation is typified by reverse exceptionalism, not by the exceptionalist tendency defined here.
Careful study of the incidence of exceptionalism in the United States’ government
procurement law will assuredly sharpen our understanding of the nature and operation of the
United States public procurement system viewed in a purely domestic law context. However,
recognizing the performance law focus of the exceptionalist aspects of United States government
contracts system becomes particularly significant when that system is viewed in comparative law
perspective. In contrast to the procurement law of the United States which addresses both issues
of contract formation and contract performance, the practice of European Community public
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procurement law as well at that of many of the major European nations is to treat rules of
contract performance as lying outside the corpus of public contract law. The theory appears to be
that the private contracts law of the individual Member States governs the performance and
enforcement of public contracts once they are duly entered into.10 This, on its face, amounts to a
commitment to an approach to government contracts performance law that we would label
congruence-based.
To be sure, in some national European and other civil law procurement law systems,
rules of law concerning public contract performance that plainly are recognizable as
“exceptionalist” have been established with respect to an ill-defined subset of public contracts
denominated as “administrative contracts.”11 And it would be idle to pretend that such rules are
not in practical effect an important part of the law of public contracts in the countries that employ
10

There is some variation on this point among the European Community Member States,
with Germany and the United Kingdom adhering to this pattern and with France most inclined to
create exceptionalist government procurement law extending to the field of contract
performance. Wolfgang Kirchhoff, Frederick J. Lees, Daniel Mitterhoff, Joshua I. Schwartz,
Nigel Shipman, REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW OF THE PEOPLE ’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, (International Republican Institute, May 2001), at 20; Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli
& Don Wallace, Jr., REGULATING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT : NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (Kluwer 2000), at 190, 192; Joshua Schwartz, supra note 5, at 479-480.
11

Schwartz, supra note 5, at 479-480. See Laurence Folliot-Lalliot, French Public
Contracts, forthcoming ___West's International Government Contractor ___ (200x) Part I,
Chap. 2. See also Jose Guilherme Giacomuzzi, Dissertation Proposal (Spring 2004), pp. 3-9,
citing: René Chapus, Droit Administratif General vol. 1, § 724, 551 (15d ed., Montchrestien
2001) (on French law); José Cretella, Jr., Dos Contratos Administrativos 38 (Forense 2001) (on
Brazilian law); Eduardo García de Enterría & Tomás-Ramón Fernández, Curso de Derecho
Administrativo vol. 1, 658-755 (9th ed., Civitas 1999) (on Spanish law); Massimo Severo
Giannini, Istituzioni di Diritto Amministrativo, 498-540 (2d ed., Giuffrè 2000) (on Italian law);
Harmut Maurer, Droit Administraif Allemand, 359-400 (translator Michel Fromont, L.G.D.J.
1994) (on German law).
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the special category of “administrative contracts.” So exceptionalism regarding the rules of
contract performance is not a complete stranger to public procurement law in Europe and other
civil law traditions. Nonetheless, accurate and penetrating comparative law analysis in the field
of public procurement law is significantly undermined by the fact that the threshold definition of
the scope and coverage of public procurement law is different in the United States from that
employed in much of Europe and elsewhere.
Specifically, because the exceptionalist aspects of United States public procurement law
system are most strikingly evidenced in doctrines governing matters that Europeans and Civilians
often portray as predominantly outside the scope of public procurement law, significant
differences between European and United States public procurement law will be obscured unless
the broadest view is taken of the field of public contract law. Conversely, any meaningful
comparative assessment must start with, and gauge accurately, the disparities between the
respective approaches to defining the field of public contracts law rules. It is suggested here –
below – that the exceptionalism/congruence spectrum has the potential to be a particularly useful
device for comparative law studies of public procurement law, transcending some of the
conventional difficulties associated with comparison in isolation of seemingly parallel portions
of disparate legal systems. Accordingly, it will be important, for that additional reason, to be
attentive to the manner in which the primary locus of United States public procurement law
exceptionalism cuts across the boundaries erected by disparate definitions of the ambit of public
procurement law.
A second major thread to the re-examination of exceptionalism in United States
government procurement law system undertaken here seeks to identify and understand the
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reason(s) for the prevalence of a strong exceptionalist influence in that system. Here it is claimed
that the historic centrality of military procurement in the development of the United States
procurement law regime --itself a relatively unusual phenomenon when viewed in comparative
perspective, is the single most important cause for the strongly exceptionalist flavor of much of
the United States’ public procurement law.12 Numerous examples are presented to support this
conclusion. The basic modes of analysis employed to support this causal explanation are
historical and doctrinal: a survey of the development of key exceptionalist features of the United
States procurement law regime, identifying the role played by military procurement in the
emergence of the relevant doctrines in key cases.
Although the underlying policy considerations will bear closer examination as we work
through the examples that support my causal explanation, it certainly should not be surprising
that engrossing military procurement within the system of public procurement law would shift
the law of public procurement in an exceptionalist direction. At least in the United States’
judicial tradition, but likely elsewhere as well, courts generally will be least prepared to strictly or
independently scrutinize the justification for government action whenever military necessity or
national security interests are invoked. In addition, the shifting fortunes of war and the
accompanying “fog of war” commonly produce circumstances that were not foreseen at the time
the parties entered into contracts related to military activities. Finally, contracts for military
equipment commonly seek goods and services that are subject to unusually rapid technological
innovation that makes frequent changes in specifications and needs especially common. For all
12

In referring to military procurement here, I refer both to procurement of
armaments–“hard defense procurement” and procurement of other categories of goods and
services the need for and of use which may not be unique to military contexts.
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these reasons, departures by government from its contractual commitments will be most readily
excused in such military contexts. Retention of flexibility to adjust to unforeseen circumstances
will be most compellingly justified in such contexts. In short, justification for departures from
the rules of private contractual obligation and excuse will be most compelling in military
procurement cases. Many systems of procurement law outside the United States have exempted
military procurement from the coverage of their requirements precisely to respond to these
important policy considerations. However, as we see in more detail below, when the
procurement law system is built around the needs and exigencies of military procurement, as was
the case in the United States, the procurement law doctrine that results is far more likely to build
in the substantial flexibility and significant latitude for adjustment of government obligations,
powers and immunities of the kind that we have labeled exceptionalism.
The central role played by military procurement in the development of the exceptionalist
tendency in United States public procurement law has evident importance for an understanding
of the interplay of congruence and exceptionalism in United States public procurement law even
if that body of law were still to be studied in isolation, as long was the custom of United States
government contracts lawyers. However, just as the locus of exceptionalism in the United States
law governing performance of government contracts had both domestic and comparative law
significance, so too does role played by military procurement in providing the primacy
explanation for exceptionalism in the procurement law regime of the United States. Although a
full exploration of this point transcends the reach of this paper, an association will be suggested
between exclusion of military procurement from the coverage of many procurement law regimes
outside the United States, and the tendency toward emphasizing congruence over exceptionalism
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in the law governing the rights and responsibilities of government regarding performance of
government contracts in such systems.
Ideally, this association should be more fully explored by examining the public
procurement law of many nations to demonstrate more comprehensively the correlation between
exclusion of military procurement from regulation and a adoption of a congruence-oriented
approach to public contract performance law and norms. The goal of such further study would
be to corroborate the present hypothesis: that a strong exceptionalist bent is more likely to
blossom when military procurement is included within the rules governing public procurement
generally. If this correlation is borne out, and if, as is claimed here, coverage of military
procurement is a significant cause of the exceptionalist bent of the United States’ procurement
law system, this relationship suggests strong policy consequences that should be carefully
considered by developing and transitional economies seeking to implement western style
transparent and competitive public procurement regimes, as well as by experts seeking to foster
the transfer of best practices from the United States to developing nations. I seek here to build
the case for the suggestion that I previously have made that
the United States’ experience provides evidence that suggests that . . . inclusion [of
military procurement within the coverage of a nascent scheme of procurement law in a
developing nation] may be very helpful to the development of key flexibility devices
within the corpus of government procurement law– both to the recognition of the policy
needs that such devices serve and to the legitimacy they can possess.13
It is entirely understandable that political and/or judicial decisions to exclude military
procurement from the coverage of a new procurement law regime may make procurement
regulation and reform more palatable politically in some quarters in developing and transitional
13

“Id. at 117.
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regimes. Still, such decisions may have unintended consequences even for the character of the
public procurement law regime governing non-military procurement. The distinctive
contribution that military procurement has made to the exceptionalist character of United States
public procurement law has been important, perhaps indeed essential, to the emergence of the
flexibility devices that are key hallmark of that procurement regime. Moreover, it is suggested
both here, and in the author’s previous work, that this exceptionalist character is, generally
speaking, a positive legacy of the development of procurement rules designed for a template of
military procurement. In sum, exclusion of military procurement from the coverage of
procurement law in emerging procurement systems may have negative spillover effects that
transcend the area of military procurement itself.
Finally, the present examination of the exceptionalist tendency in the United States
public procurement system is important the exceptionalism/congruence spectrum has value as a
tool that can enhance comparative law analysis in the field of public procurement law. Plainly a
direct comparison, in isolation, of features of disparate legal systems, even when those features
appear to fill parallel functions and occupy comparable niches, is hazardous, and likely to be
confusing and unreliable, if not downright misleading.14 The exceptionalism/congruence
14

In the introduction to their treatise on comparative law, Zweigert and Kotz explain the
inherent difficulty of the comparative law enterprise:
Comparative lawyers have long known that only rules which perform the same function
and address the same real problem or conflict of interests can profitably be compared.
They also know that they must cut themselves loose from their own doctrinal and
juridical preconceptions and liberate themselves from their own cultural context in order
to discover ‘neutral’ concepts with which to describe such problems or conflicts of
interest . . . . Legal sociologists not only accept this but apply it with a rigor which the
comparative lawyer finds stimulating, if a bit worrying, for legal sociologists can
sometimes show that concepts and features which the comparative lawyer regards as
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spectrum, however, is a construct that can help us sidestep some of the pitfalls entailed in such
direct comparisons.
For that construct is based on a comparison that operates, initially, within the confines of
a given legal system. That is, this approach starts with a comparison of a particular feature of the
law of government contracts in a given legal system with the analogous rules concerning private
contracting, within the same legal system. Specifically, this construct poses the question of
whether government contracting parties and private contracting parties have different liabilities
and immunities with regard to the performance or alteration of their respective agreements.
Under the approach suggested here, it is only after that initial assessment of congruence and
‘neutral’ and therefore suitable for the definition of the problem are in fact nationally or
culturally conditioned, or that they implicitly presuppose the existence of a particular
social context which in reality only exists in one of the places under comparison and not
in the other.
Konrad Zweigert & Heinrich Kotz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed., Tr. Tony
Weir; Oxford U. Press, 1998), p. 10-11. For further elaboration of this point, see also id. at 3640.
John Henry Merryman has explained some of the hazards and pitfalls of attempting to do
comparative law analysis:
Legal rules are what most people think of as law, and a good deal of the work of
comparative lawyers is devoted to the description and evaluation of such rules. Much of
the concern about the divergence of legal systems is phrased in terms of rules, and much
of the effort toward unification of law is rule-oriented. But there is a very important
sense in which a focus on rules is superficial and misleading: superficial because because
rules literally lie on the surface of legal systems whose true dimensions are found
elsewhere; misleading because we are led to assume that if rules are made to resemble
each other something significant by way of rapprochement has been accomplished . . . .
John Henry Merryman, The Convergence (and Divergence of the Civil Law and the Common
Law, in Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE (Boston,
Sijthoff Pub. Co. 1978), p. 222-223, quoted in John H. Barton, James Lowell Gibbs, Jr., Victor
Hao Li & John Henry Merryman, LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES (West Pub. Co.
1983), p. 1.
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exceptionalism within a particular legal system has been undertaken that comparisons are to be
drawn directly between two legal systems.
Once the initial assessment of exceptionalism and congruence has been made within each
of the systems to be compared, a valid meta-comparison between two systems can and should be
made, analysis focusing on the degree of exceptionalism or congruence manifested within each
of the systems being compared. Proceeding in this manner, it is possible to compare systems
without running so seriously afoul of the problems that are conventionally understood to make
more direct comparison of isolated bits of disparate legal systems inherently confusing,
unreliable and misleading. While this article does not presume to implement this plan of
comparative analysis, comparing the United States’ procurement law system and any other public
procurement law system, in any comprehensive fashion, it does offer preliminary evidence to
support the conclusion that coverage of military procurement within a nation’s procurement law
system is correlated with an exceptionalist approach to procurement law and policy and that
exclusion of military procurement is associated with a congruence approach. In addition, this
Article delineates a method for undertaking such a comparative analysis and makes an argument
for special utility of comparative analysis employing this approach.
The next portion of this Article, Part II, comprises a survey of significant exceptionalist
doctrines in the United States’ law of public procurement. There I seek to sharpen our definition
of exceptionalism, to identify the primary locus of exceptionalism, and to substantiate the strong
association that the author has postulated between the law of performance of government
contracts and the exceptionalist tendency within the larger corpus of United States government
contract law. The survey of exceptionalist doctrines demonstrates that exceptionalism in the law
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of public procurement, as I have defined it here, is primarily, though not exclusively, a creature
of the law governing federal public contract performance, rather than contract formation.
Part III of this Article makes the case for a strong causal link between the consistent
centrality of military procurement in the development of the procurement legal regime in the
United States and the striking exceptionalist strain in United States’ public procurement law.
Initially, in Part III(A), we confront a methodological difficulty inherent in making this kind of
claim about the “causes” of an important feature of United States law, or any analogous claim
about the antecedents of any legal doctrine. This difficulty is in part a product of the inherent
difficulty of establishing historic causation in any setting, and a fortiori in attempting to account
for the origins of any legal doctrine. But the difficulty is also inherent in the nature of the
comparative law enterprise to which this Article seeks to make a contribution. While these
difficulties of causal explanation and comparative analysis are real, and must be acknowledged
forthrightly, this Article identifies a methodology that enables us to move the argument forward,
without pretending to complete the comparative analysis. Like much scholarship that proposes
an analytical framework for a distinctive body of law, this Article invites extension of the work
presented in the form of contributions from other scholars examining the same problems in
different legal settings, including those of radically different legal cultures.
Part III(B) of this Article attempts, in relatively brief compass, to establish a basic claim
that is predominantly descriptive, about the United States’ procurement law system. This is a
claim the truth of which probably is taken for granted by those who are familiar with that system.
It is simply that military procurement and its regulation have served as the template for the
development of the entire United States public procurement law regime, both historically, and on
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into the current era. At least until the post-World War II era, civilian agency procurement and its
regulation were been relatively minor parts of this regulatory system. Civilian procurement was
not the main driving force behind the development of the innovative legal regime that supports
the United States’ federal public procurement system. Although this point is taken for granted by
many who are knowledgeable about the operation of the United States’ system, the centrality of
military procurement to the regulated procurement system of the United States in fact
distinguishes it from the transparent and competitive procurement regimes of most other
developed nations.
Finally, in Part III C, I present the causal argument about the role of military procurement
in establishing an exceptionalist procurement regime. Using selected, but representative,
examples of significant exceptionalist doctrines, I endeavor to demonstrate the unusually
important role that the military procurement context has played in leading judicial decisions and
legislative and administrative developments that have established the exceptionalist flavor of
United States federal public procurement law. Based on a review of these examples, one could
hardly fail to recognize the impact of military procurement in establishing the character of this
body of law. Although further comparative law analysis is required to provide another kind of
evidence that could corroborate my claim here, review of the internal development of the United
States federal public procurement law regime strongly supports the theory that military
procurement has caused the strikingly exceptional character of that system of law.

II. What is Exceptionalism? Where and When Does it Occur?
To define exceptionalism in the United States law of public procurement with greater
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precision, it is critical, initially, to identify doctrines and practices that should be identified as
leading examples of the phenomenon of exceptionalism. As indicated in the Introduction, our
survey will reveal that the bulk, though surely not all, of these are to be found in the law
governing federal government contract performance and disputes associated with contract
performance, rather than that addressed to public contract formation. The survey that follows is
necessarily selective, and the explanation of salient doctrines limited; otherwise it would
inexorably develop into a treatise on the law of United States government contracts law. The
watchword for what follows is to provide the reader with enough documentation to support the
analysis undertaken and the conclusions drawn therefrom.

A. Exceptionalism in the Law Governing Public Contract Performance and Performance
Disputes
Among the salient examples of exceptionalism that arise in the area of the law relating to
public contract performance are the following:
•

the far-reaching power of federal government contracting officers to terminate a contract
“for the convenience of the government” in a very wide range of circumstances, even in
the absence of any contractor’s breach, without incurring full liability for expectancy
damages15
15

See, e.g. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2 (FAR prescribed standardized Termination for
Convenience Clause for fixed-price contracts for goods and services). See John Cibinic & Ralph
Nash, ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS(3d ed. 1995) (hereinafter
“ADMINISTRATION ”), at 1073-1134 . Fact patterns in which termination for convenience may
successfully be invoked plainly include many in which the government’s action, would if the
clause is inapplicable or unenforceable, be a breach of contract, giving rise to full loss-of-profits
expectancy damages, just as these facts would in a dispute between parties to a private contract.
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!

the broad power of federal government contracting officers unilaterally to institute
substantial changes in the scope and nature of the work to be performed under the
contract, in return for which the contractor is assured of an “equitable adjustment” -without the government either incurring full liability for breach (at the time of the
unilateral change order) or voiding the contract ab initio;16

•

the broad power of federal government contracting officers unilaterally to suspend or
defer the performance of a government contract, again without either incurring full
liability for breach or voiding the contract, in return for which the contractor is again
assured an “equitable adjustment;”17

In addition, the broad power conferred by the termination for convenience clause risks depriving
the government contract of consideration sufficient to render it enforceable, at least under the
standards of private contracts. See Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 768-772 (Ct. Cl.
1982) (opinion of Bennett, J.); see also G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418,
423-424 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965) (portraying breach as “normal”
contract law classification for conduct treated as subject to termination for convenience clause,
where it is applicable).
16

See, e.g 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1 (Federal Acquisition Regulation (hereinafter “FAR”)
provision prescribing a standardized changes clause for inclusion in fixed price contracts). See,
Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION , supra note 15, at 381-485 (summarizing the law of public
contract “changes”). Such changes would, which may radically alter the performance that the
contract is called upon to deliver or the profit that it may ultimately receive, would in the context
of an ordinary private contract, likely be considered breaches of the contract. This appears
particularly to be true in cases where the constructive change label was applied after the fact by a
court to requirements imposed by the the contracting officer that he or she did not
contemporaneously recognize as enlarging the contractor’s obligations beyond those prescribed
in contract itself. See, e.g. W. H. Edwards Enginr’g Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 322 (1963).
Alternatively, in an ordinary private contract the retention of the power unilaterally to make such
changes might well be considered to make the government’s contractual undertaking “illusory”
and the contract, accordingly, unenforceable.
17

See, e.g. 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-12 (FAR-prescribed standardized Suspension of Work
clause for fixed price construction contract); 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-13 (FAR-prescribed
standardized Stop-Work Order Clause for contracts for supply of goods or services); 48 C.F.R. §
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•

the “strict compliance rule”: that is, the absence of any materiality threshold when the
government wishes to terminate a government contract for default because of defects in
the contractor’s performance;18

52.212-15 (FAR-prescribed standardized constructive suspension clause for use in contracts for
the supply of goods or services). See Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION , supra note 15, at 586618. Like the institution of a change order, a suspension order or constructive suspension arising
from delay covered by the foregoing provisions, might well, in their absence, be regarded as a
fully compensable breach of contract. This is particularly true of the constructive suspension
authority, which takes effect with regard to delays that were not contemporaneously characterized
by a contracting officer as an exercise of suspension authority. See, e.g. Hoel-Steffen Construc.
Co., 456 F.2d 460 (Ct. of Cl. 1972)(illustrating that fact pattern). Alternatively, the
government’s retention in the contract of this broad authority unilaterally to adjust the timing
required for the contractor’s performance and the timing of its own contractually obligated
payments, might well, in an ordinary private contract, render the agreement illusory and
unenforceable.
18

See, e.g. Arrow Lacquer Corp., ASBCA No. 4667, Navy Appeals Panel, Contract #
N383-32050A (Oct. 31, 1958)(slight color deviation from standard in color of primer coat of
paint is ground for termination for default even though the primer coast is covered by a top coat
and no suggestion was made as to how or why the trivial color discrepancy might affect
performance); De Vito v. United States, 413 F.2d 1147, 1154-1155 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (time is “of the
essence” in any government contract containing a fixed date for performance–unless the time for
performance is waived by the words or deeds of authorized government agents); but see Franklin
E. Penny Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 668 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (suggesting that time was not
necessarily always of the essence in a government contract). See Cibinic & Nash,
ADMINISTRATION , supra note 15, at 908-918.
Note that the FAR provisions governing default termination generally provide three
categories of grounds for such termination: 1) violation of a qualitative performance
specification, 2) actually missing an interim or final contractual performance deadline, and 3)
conduct that seriously endangers the ultimate timely performance of the contract,. See, e.g. 48
C.F.R. § 52.249-8 (prescribing a standardized termination for default clause for fixed price
supply and service contracts). The very existence of the third category reveals that, both as to
timeliness and as to measures of qualitative performance, the government contractor has less
latitude than its counterpart on a purely private contract to avoid liability by asserting that any
shortcoming of its own performance was non-material.
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•

the government’s right to terminate a contractor for default because of the contractor’s
slow progress that endangers ultimate timely performance even where the contractor has
not missed any ultimate or interim contractual deadline or benchmark for performance;19

•

the principles of Clearfield Trust20 and its sequelae,21 which establish that interpretation
of federal government contracts is, inherently, a question of federal law, even though state
law would generally govern disputes arising under private contracts that are adjudicated
in federal court.22 These principles dictate, moreover, that federal judge-made law
19

This noteworthy exceptionalist feature of the law about default termination of federal
public contracts is expressly reflected in the termination for default clause. See, e.g. 48 C.F.R. §
52.249-8 (default termination clause for fixed price supply and service contracts.) The second of
the three generic grounds for default termination of a federal public contract that is noted
above–endangering the ultimate timely performance of a government contract–does not appear to
have any full counterpart in the law of private contracts. This provision allows the government
to terminate when the contractor has not actually missed any fixed contractual requirement of
timely performance. Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION , supra note 15, at 929-935. Such a
failure to progress without actually missing a deadline for performance under the contract would
not, absent the exceptional provisions of the standard clauses governing termination for default
of government contracts, constitute a breach by the contractor were the standards that apply to
private agreements to be applied. United States v. O’Brien, 220 U.S. 321, 327 (1911) (Holmes,
J.) (contrasting federal procurement doctrine with state contract law on this point).
20

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).

21

See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (refining, applying and
distinguishing Clearfield Trust as described further infra note 23).
22

Clearfield was noteworthy, and perhaps a surprise because it was decided shortly after
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), had strongly underscored the importance, for
federalism reasons, of using state law rules as the rules of decision for cases decided in federal
courts, absent a rule of decision provided by the federal positive law. It is familiar ground that
Erie rested in part on the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. §1652, and in part on principles of
constitutional federalism. The well-known holding of Erie is the categorical declaration that
“[t]here is no federal general common law.” 304 U.S. at 78.
In Clearfield the issue was whether the rights of the United States with respect to
commercial paper that it issues–a government check– are governed by state or federal law.
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should ordinarily be fashioned to fill any gaps in the relevant positive law, leaving little
occasion for the borrowing of the state law rules that normally govern private contracts to
fill these gaps.23
There was no federal statute addressing the specific issue presented and the relevant federal
regulations did not address the specific question presented either. 318 U.S. at 366-367 & n.2.
Moreover the Court did not identify any constitutional provision that dictated the rule of decision
or dictated that it be a federal rule of decision. Although the Rules of Decision Act itself
specifies that state law should govern disputes in federal court “except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States otherwise require or provide,” 28 U.S.C. §1652 (emphasis added),
the Court nonetheless concluded that federal law– if necessary, judge-made– should control the
case. The Court explained:
When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a
constitutional function or power. This check was issued for services performed under the
Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115. The authority to issue the check had
its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no way
dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or any other state . . . . The duties imposed on the
United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of that issuance find their roots in
the same federal sources. In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the
federal courts to fashion the governing rule according to their own standards . . . .
318 U.S. at 366-367 (emphasis added; footnote omitted.) What is significant here is just how
weak the argument for application of federal law should have appeared in light of the then-recent
Erie decision. There was no applicable Constitutional provision cited, and no constitutional
“require[ment] or provi[sion]” dictating a federal rule of decision can be identified. Similarly, no
statutory basis for the application of federal law can be identified that appears to rise to the level
of a “require[ment] or provi[sion]” dictating creation of a federal rule of decision. The fact that
federal government contracts arise out of the functioning of the federal government seems to be
enough to dictate a federal rule of decision, even though the threshold for escaping the operation
of the Rules of Decision Act had not been met in literal terms. And the court ignores entirely any
obstacle to this result posed by the extra-statutory dimension given to the Rules of Decision Act
in Erie itself.
23

It is important to recognize that Clearfield has this second layer of exceptionalism, in
addition to the first. Even after the Court determined that the rule of decision should be federal,
and judge-made, if there is a gap in relevant positive federal law, the Court goes on to consider
the subsidiary question whether, in fashioning federal common law to meet the needs of the case
for a rule of decision, a federal court should borrow–that is, voluntarily adopt as its own– the
relevant state law decisional law. Id. at 367. But the Court rejected that alternative for most
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federal contract disputes, noting that federal government’s powerful interest in having a uniform
set of rules to govern its vast array of contracts–in this case checks– of a particular character
required that there be a uniform federal rule of decision, rather than a borrowing of any state law.
Id.
The exceptionalist character of the rule of Clearfield is underscored in deliciously ironic
fashion when the Supreme Court then proceeded, entirely unselfconsciously it appears, to justify
the creation of a federal body of commercial common law to govern cases like this, by pointing
to the availability of the body of “federal law merchant, developed for about a century under the
regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1,” which “stands as a convenient source of reference for
fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions.” 318 U.S. at 367. Of course, Swift
v. Tyson is the decision that was overruled by Erie, which effectively decreed that this body of
“federal law merchant” should be no more!
Despite the doubly exceptionalist approach taken in Clearfield, the subsequent decision in
Kimbell Foods (see supra note 20) has qualified this second layer of exceptionalism, but only to
a modest degree and in respects unrelated to typical federal procurement contracts. In Kimbell
Foods, the Court listed 3 factors that should enter into the choice whether to borrow state law
rules to supply the federal rule of decision or to “fashion a nationwide [judge-made] federal
rule.” 440 U.S. at 727-728. These are :
•
•
•

whether the particular federal program inherently requires uniform of nationwide
operation that would “necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules” (id. at728);
whether even “[a]part from considerations of uniformity . . . [borrowing] of state law[derived rules] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs” (id..); and
whether the “application of a [judge-made uniform federal common law] rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law” (id. at 729). In other words, is
there a strong interest in borrowing state law to decide the rights of federal parties so as to
harmonize and integrate the law governing their rights with the web of law applicable to
the non-federal interests.

The Clearfield rule, even as amplified by Kimbell, affords striking latitude for fashioning
federal rules of decision to govern federal questions arising in disputes involving federal
contracts. Moreover, the Clearfield/Kimbell analysis leaves almost no room for the borrowing of
state law to govern questions arising in federal public procurement. Because of the voluminous
provisions and extensive reach of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its supplements,
together with that of the federal statutes applicable to government contracts, there is relatively
rarely a gap in federal positive law that even invites the possibility of borrowing state law.
Moreover, even when there is such a gap, application of the Kimbell 3 factor analysis will
virtually never lead to borrowing of state law. In federal procurement cases, there is invariably a
compelling need for a nationally uniform rule to govern the nationally uniform activity of
procurement. Morover, there are invariably strong federal interests in the operation of the federal
program that would be undercut by application of state law that would preclude borrowing of
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Still other key exceptionalist rules that are applied in the law governing contract
performance in the federal public procurement system include:
•

the G.L. Christian24 doctrine, which holds that standardized clauses that ought to have
been included in a federal government contract, but which were omitted due to an error of
federal agents, should nonetheless be read into the contracts from which they were
mistakenly omitted;25 and

state law. See, e.g. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963)(state may not constitutionally
enforce its milk sale minimum price regulation with respect to contracts for sale of milk to
federal instrumentalities). And finally, it would be unusual for there to be any compelling
interest –arising from the need for integration of federal and private transactions– to make
operation of the rules governing federal procurement track the rules governing private
transactions. Most federal procurement is simply too discrete an activity to warrant any such
conclusion. Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5, at 775-776.
Taken one at a time these arguments generally are quite strong; collectively their impact will
almost never permit borrowing of state law. In sum, the contrast between the unique federal law
regime that governs federal procurement under federal positive law, including the FAR, together
with Clearfield/Kimbell and, on the other hand, the regime of state law that governs analogous
private contract disputes –even when they arise in federal court– under the Erie doctrine, reflects
a profoundly exceptionalist approach.
24

See G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 821 (1965).
25

In G.L. Christian, the seminal case, in 1958 the United States Army had terminated, for
the convenience of the government, a contract for the construction of a large complex of military
personnel housing at Fort Polk, Louisiana. See infra TANs ___-___ for discussion of the
termination for convenience clause and the associated doctrines. The termination for
convenience was triggered by a decision to deactivate Fort Polk itself in 1958. The responsible
contracting officer, however, evidently mistakenly omitted the standard termination for
convenience clause from this construction contract. Accordingly, the contractor asserted that the
government had not reserved the power to terminate for convenience and was accordingly liable
for breach of contract. In practical effect, the difference was this: under a termination for
convenience clause the contractor would be entitled to be made whole by allowing it recovery of
all expenses reasonably incurred prior to the contract termination and unavoidable ongoing
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•

the immunity of the federal government from liability under any contract “implied in
law.”26

expenses. By contrast, the contractor asserted the right to full expectancy damages, including
recovery of the anticipated profits that it would have earned had the contract performance gone
forward. 312 F.2d at 419, 423-424.
The court of appeals held that because the government’s statutorily-authorized
procurement regulations directed that a standardized termination for convenience clause should
have been included in this construction contract, “the contract must be read as if it did,” even
though it actually omitted the required language. Id. at 424. Some language in the court’s
opinion might suggest that the result was limited to cases where an experienced defense
contractor specifically should have known that the omitted clause was required to be, and was
intended to be, included. Id. at 426-427. However, subsequent decisions have treated this as a
bright line rule and have obviated any inquiry into whether the particular contractor knew or
should have known of the particular required clause that was omitted. Schwartz, PROCUREMENT
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5, at {123}.
26

In the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the United States waived sovereign
immunity, consenting to be sued on a variety of classes of claims, including “any claim against
the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the United States.”
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently “held that this jurisdiction extends only
to contracts either express or implied in fact, and not to claims on contracts implied in law.”
Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996). Thus the United States retains its
sovereign immunity from claims under any implied in law contract. Hercules sets forth the
traditional delineation between contracts implied-in-fact (on which the United States can be
sued) and contracts implied in law:
The distinction between “implied in fact” and “implied in law,” and the consequent
limitation, is well established in our cases. An agreement implied in fact is “founded
upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is
inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, their tacit understanding.” . . . . By contrast, an agreement implied in law
is a “fiction of law” where “a promise is imputed to perform a legal duty, as to repay
money obtained by fraud or duress.”
417 U.S. at 423-424 (citations omitted). The exceptionalist character of this particular doctrinal
limitation on the liability of the United States emerges, of course, from the fact that liability for
private parties operating under private agreements can arise both for breach of breach of impliedin-fact contracts and for breach of implied-in-law contracts.
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Many of the foregoing exceptionalist doctrines will be striking, indeed, to those
accustomed to the norms of private contract law. Perhaps the single most striking example of the
exceptionalist phenomenon, however, is the government’s broad power to terminate a federal
procurement contract “for the convenience of the government,” noted above.27 Nonetheless, as
striking as the government’s special power to terminate its contracts for its own “convenience”
may be, the true apotheosis of exceptionalism is found elsewhere--in the sovereign acts doctrine,
and the related unmistakability doctrine, described here in the ensuing text.
These two interrelated and overlapping doctrines together require that government
contracts be read to reserve to the government an extraordinary generic power. They accord the
government the power to take, without incurring liability, a broad range of acts in the course of
exercising of its sovereign authority to regulate and other sovereign powers. Although these acts
may have the practical effect of interfering substantially with the government’s own obligations
under a government contract, or burdening the contractor’s prescribed performance, and might
appear to constitute a breach of contract were it carried out by a private party in parallel
circumstances, these doctrines, where applicable, excuse the government from liability.28
27
28

See supra TAN ___.

The exact contours and the history and policy foundations of the Sovereign Acts and
Unmistakability Doctrines are complex, controversial and difficult subjects. There is no need for
present purposes to immerse the reader in the details of these sometimes arcane doctrines. The
present author has written extensively to address these matters elsewhere, and refers the
interested reader to that body of earlier work for a more detailed account. See Schwartz, Liability
for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1; Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1; Schwartz, Wake
of Winstar, supra note 1; Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5,
at {175-178, 191-196, 208-209}.
In addition, in Part IIIC of this Article, a brief account is offered of the historical genesis
of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine, which will afford the reader some concrete examples of its
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These last examples of exceptionalism in the law of federal public contract performance,
the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability doctrines, makes clear why these doctrines are classified
as exceptionalist. Applying the norms of private contracts the kind of governments actions that
are excused by these doctrines generally would be regarded as a breach of contract.29
Alternatively the very reservation of the wide-ranging immunity reserved by the government
would likely void the contract, were it a private engagement, because it would render the
undertaking optional or too uncertain, resulting in a failure of consideration or an illusory
contract. The Sovereign Acts Doctrine and Unmistakability Doctrine also offer particularly
potent evidence of the exceptionalist character of the norms of public contract performance in
the United States because these particular doctrines provide allow the government a universally
applicable set of rules of construction, powers and immunities, potentially overriding and
supplementing a broad array of more specific doctrines of contract interpretation and
performance. The government’s broad termination for convenience authority shares this general
characteristic of acting as a sort of “universal solvent” for normal contract obligations.
Other examples of exceptionalist contract performance-related rules with the particularly
application and typical effect. See infra TAN ___-___.
29

Central difficulties in mapping the contours of the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability
Doctrines arise both 1) from the fact that the government frequently enters into agreements for
which there is no plausible private analogue, and 2) frequently acts in a manner that has the
practical effecting of undermining the performance of its own contracts by exercising
governmental powers that no private party could exercise. These twin facts underlie the policy
justification for creating the sovereign acts and unmistakability doctrines. But they also render in
coherent many of the courts efforts to prescribe the proper scope and effect of the operation of
this doctrine. See Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1, at 653-658; 689-691,
697-702; Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1, at 520-523, 552-565; Schwartz, Wake of
Winstar, supra note 1, at 1193-1197.
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broad reach and sweeping effect that distinguish the termination for convenience doctrine, and
the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines that are worthy of being singled out here are
the choice of law doctrine of Clearfield Trust and the omission-filling rule of G.L. Christian30
that are described above. By governing and supplementing the applicable body of law, these
doctrines directly and indirectly assure that federal government contracts are interpreted and
enforced under a uniform regime that is constructed to take into account the to the special needs,
and policy priorities of the government, as well as the exigencies it may face. G.L. Christian
effectively blends a breach-excusing rule with this kind of government-friendly specialized
choice of law rule.31
Plainly a full description of the operation of each of these doctrines is beyond the reach
and scope of this article. Indeed, one way of stating my basic point in this Part of this Article is
to reflect that, because of their number, their far-reaching impact, and their pervasiveness in the
United States’ law of performance of public contracts, such a full description of these
exceptionalist doctrines would convert this Article, willy-nilly, into a replication of Nash and
Cibinic’s leading treatise on ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.32 In the foregoing
discussion, I accordingly have settled for brief explanations, with citations in the margins to
sample provisions of the FAR, a few illustrative cases, and cross references to an authoritative
treatise. The discussion that has been provided nonetheless should suffice to establish a key

30

See supra TANs ___-___ (regarding Clearfield) & note ___ (regarding G.L. Christian)

31

See infra TAN ___-___ (regarding G.L. Christian).

32

Cibinic & Nash, ADMINISTRATION , supra note 15.
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aspect of my thesis in this Part of this Article: that there is a strikingly exceptionalist cast to
much of the law of federal public contracts and that that tendency is prominently on display in
the law that governs disputes arising out of the performance of federal public contracts. Part IIB
now moves on to survey the incidence of exceptionalism elsewhere in the United States’ law of
federal public contracts.33

B. Exceptionalism in Other Contexts: “Reverse” or “Positive” Exceptionalism
As mentioned at the outset, government procurement law rules that have an exceptionalist
cast are not entirely limited to the body of law that governs disputes about the performance of
such contracts. As we shall see, this conclusion will stand even after a significant clarification as
to the proper understanding of government contracts “exceptionalism” is established here.
Specifically, government contracts rules are properly considered to be exceptionalist only when
they excuse the government from duties or obligations that it might otherwise bear, or lend it
powers or immunities that it otherwise would lack, were its rights judged under the norms
applicable to private parties that have entered into private contracts.34 Exceptionalism in the law
of public procurement, then, should be understood to denote only these kinds of rules, which

33

For the benefit of any reader less familiar with basic public contract law doctrines, it is
noted here that Part IIIC of this paper will describe in more detail the emergence of selected
exceptionalist doctrines. In particular, there the reader will find a fuller account of two of the
most dramatically exceptionalist doctrines that operate in the United States’ law of performance
of government contracts: the broad power of the United States to terminate its contracts “for the
convenience of the government,” and Sovereign Acts Doctrine, which saves the government
from liability for breach in a wide range of circumstances.
34

See supra TAN 5-7.
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reflect what the author has sometimes labeled negative exceptionalism, because they reduce the
government’s duties and obligations, and subject contractors to enhanced government powers
and immunities.35
By contrast, there is, of course, a broad array of doctrines, primarily applicable to the
formation of federal public procurement contracts, that impose procedural duties and substantive
standards on the United States that a private contracting party would not bear. These
requirements, might better be labeled “reverse” exceptionalism” because they increase rather
than reduce the duties and obligations of the government, and are quite distinct from the
phenomenon of exceptionalism that is under study here.36 Of course, one may quite plausibly
view these two phenomena as inextricably intertwined facets of a single phenomenon that sets
the rules of engagement for those who would enter into the government contracting market.
Under these rules of engagement, the government contractor or would-be contractor is effectively
told that the extra obligations the government will bear, especially in contract formation (“reverse
exceptionalism”), come with a price tag in the form of the exceptionalist powers and immunities
that the government will enjoy once the contract has been awarded.37
35
36
37

See supra TAN notes 7-8 & note 8.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

This perspective would appear germane in assessing the argument that some of the
features of the government contracts law regime effectively operate as barriers to entry into the
market to provide goods and services to the government, and thereby undesirably contract that
marketplace by discouraging and deterring entry by those not established as government
contractors. See William Kovacic, Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government
Procurement, 25 POLICY SCIENCES 29 (1991). At the same time, this perspective is not offered
as a refutation to the concerns identified by Kovacic’s analysis. This is in part because the cost of
exceptionalism to putative contractors may outweigh the value to them of the government’s
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If only to demonstrate their distinctly different cast, the most salient illustrations of this
reverse exceptionalism should be mentioned very briefly here. Most importantly, these include
the duties imposed on military and civilian agencies to award contracts after a process that
constitutes “full and open competition,”38 unless there is both a substantive exception that is
properly applicable and, moreover, the required transparent procedures necessary properly to
invoke such an exception have been fulfilled.39 These also include the requirement to use an
approved transparent process of securing full and open competition, usually either sealed bidding
or competitive negotiation/competitive proposals, and adherence to a structured set of criteria
governing the choice of competitive procedure.40 There are detailed prescriptions as to the
unique affirmative obligations in some or even many settings. Moreover, it is important to
emphasize that not all reverse exceptionalist burdens borne by the procuring agency under the
federal procurement law regime actually translate into benefits for the contractor or would be
contractor. It is more likely, however, that most, if not all, of the benefits to the government of
true exceptionalism are experienced by contractors as additional costs and risks of doing business
with the government. Accordingly, even though the benefits and costs to contractors of
exceptionalism and reverse exceptionalism should be assessed as a package, in appraising the
barriers to entry issue raised by Kovacic, that accounting must be done in particularized fashion,
focusing on the distinctive impact on contractors of particular rules under scrutiny, if it is to be
meaningful as a tool for policy analysis. It also remains true that there may be important public
monetary and non-monetary values served by exceptionalist government contracts rules that may
justify their net social cost, even if a particularized assessment were to reveal that the net effect
of the government contract law regime taken as a whole is to serve as a significant barrier to
entry to this marketplace.
38

10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1)(A)( regarding military and NASA contracting); 41 U.S.C. §
253(a) (regarding contracting by most civilian agencies). For subsequent examples of such
positive exceptionalist requirements, citations are given only for the statutory provisions
applicable to military contracting, although there are invariably parallel provisions in the statute
regulating civilian agency procurement with respect to the examples given.
39

10 U.S.C. § 2304(c).

40

10 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2)

Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04), page 31

criteria and procedures to be used by agencies in selecting a winning bidder or proposal from
among the competing offers or proposals,41 “debriefing”–that is, advising, losing offerors as to
the agency’s reasons for favoring a competing proposal,42 and equally detailed rules and
procedures governing the determination of whether a contractor is qualified to receive a contract
award.43 In some cases the operation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause also
contributes to the procedures that the government must observe in debarring a contractor, or
making a recurring or stigmatizing non-responsibility determination.44 In each of these instances
private parties engaging in contractual procurement do not bear these same judicially enforceable
obligations or any nearly analogous set of duties. Although these are representative of some of
the most salient government-unique duties that the government bears under the law of
government contract formation, this scarcely exhausts the relevant category. This listing should
suffice, however, to establish that although the law of government contract formation departs
dramatically from the norms of private contracting, the overwhelming thrust of the departure is in
the direction of imposing extra duties on the government. These tend to be duties that afford
would-be government contractors the benefit of a transparent and competitive procurement
regime, and thus do not resemble the kind of exceptionalism that the author has defined as a

41

10 U.S.C. § 2305.

42

10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(5)

43

See 48 C.F.R. § 9.103- 9.104 (FAR’s basic provisions regarding responsibility
determination); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (FAR provisions on causes for debarment)
44

1980)

Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. V. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
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particular hallmark of the law of federal public procurement contract performance and disputes
pertaining thereto.45
Of course, as important, or even more important, in practical terms, than all of the
foregoing requirements, in fastening special duties on procuring government agencies that have
no private sector counterparts, is the routine availability of judicial and non-judicial bid protest
mechanisms that make the reverse exceptionalist doctrines enforceable.46 In realistic terms it is
the assurance of the enforceability of these requirements offered by the bid protest forums that
makes these substantive and procedural reverse exceptionalist requirements of value to
contractors and a source of real obligation for government agencies engaged in procurement. In
sum, although government contract formation is marked by substantial departures from the

45

There are, of course, also doctrines of government contract formation that tend to
follow the requirements of the law of private contract formation, reflecting congruence rather
than exceptionalism, except insofar as particular requirements may be specifically modified by
specific exceptionalist requirements. Significant examples of such doctrines include:
•
the rule that a binding offer followed by a binding acceptance yields a binding contract
obligation (United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S. 313 (1919) (see infra TAN
___-___));
•
the rule that consideration ordinarily is required to support a binding government contract
(Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489 (1923); Torncello v. United
States, 681 F.2d 756, 768-772 (Ct. Cl. 1982));
•
the recognition of a “statute of frauds” requirement that most contracts be entered in
writing in order to be enforceable (United States v. American Renaissance Lines, 494
F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1974); and
•
the rule that implied-in-fact contracts may be recognized as obligations of the United
States (Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423-424 (1996); Algonac v. Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241 (Ct. Cl. 1970)).
46

31 U.S.C. §§ 3551- 3556 (bid protest authority of the General Accounting Office); 28
U.S.C. § 1491(b) (bid protest jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims; former bid protest
jurisdiction of the United States District Courts, in conjunction with the federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701- 706).
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norms of private contracting, most of those departures do not represent the exceptionalism
defined previously by the author or which is the focus of this Article, which indeed
characteristically is found primarily in the law of public contract performance. Some counterexamples, genuinely exceptionalist elements of the law of public contract formation and related
doctrines, are considered in Part IIIC of this Article, which follows shortly.
It is also noteworthy that the reverse exceptionalist requirements found in United States
public procurement law, such as the basic requirements for full and open competition and the
rules governing the procedures for competitive procurement, and the availability of bid protest
procedures, which were briefly listed in the Part IIB of this Article, form the heart of the common
ground that exists between the norms of United States and the European Community regarding
procurement. From the European Community point of view, in effect, the bulk of public
procurement law lies in this category. However, as we have emphasized here, the scope of
public procurement law in the United States, substantially transcends this category,
encompassing the genuinely exceptionalist regime of public contract performance law that is so
significant a part of the United States procurement system.

C. Genuine Exceptionalism in the United States Law of Federal Public Contract Formation and
Line-Straddling Doctrines
Despite the clear predominance of doctrines governing contract performance among the
exceptionalist aspects of United States public procurement law, there are certainly significant
departures from the norms of private contract law that pertain to the substantive norms for
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contract formation and, most importantly, the process for selecting the government’s contracting
partner. As noted in the previous section of this Article, these should be subdivided further into
the reverse exceptionalist rules surveyed in Part IIB that depart from the norms of private
contract law by imposing special obligations on the government, and truly exceptionalist
doctrines that serve primarily to limit the liability or obligations of the government arising out of
contracting. As explained above, however, most of the departures from the norms of private
contracting that pertain to contract formation fall into the former category of reverse
exceptionalism.
Still, there are some significant genuinely exceptionalist elements to the law of federal
public contract formation in the United States that should be noted here briefly in order to give
the reader an accurate overall picture of the scope and incidence of exceptionalism in United
States public contract law. These include:
•

the Anti-Deficiency Act,47 and Appropriations Clause,48 which protect the United States
from entering into a binding contract absent a covering appropriation made by
Congress;49 and

•

the regulatory requirement that, even without offering a binding option contract to the
government, a bid unsupported by consideration nonetheless ordinarily is binding and
47

31 U.S.C. § 1341

48

United States Const., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7.

49

See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 426-427 (1996) (re: Anti-Deficiency
Act); Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424-434 (1990)(re:
Appropriations Clause); Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1284 (2002), cert. denied, 539
U.S. 910 (2003) (dictum re: Anti-Deficiency Act).
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may not ordinarily be withdrawn after the date fixed for opening of bids. The
government may accept such a bid, despite a purported withdrawal, creating a binding
contract, and hold the contractor liable for default if it declines to perform.50

In addition to these doctrines that are characteristically part of the law of public contract
formation, there are significant exceptionalist rules that affect both issues of contract formation
and disputes arising out of contract performance. Salient examples are the interrelated doctrines
that apparent authority does not operate against the United States and that the United States is
generally immune from the operation of equitable estoppel.51 These rules may be invoked to bar
recognition of a contract ab initio where it is entered by a person who lacks actual authority.52 Or
they may be invoked to bar recognition of a binding contract where a contract is entered in
violation of applicable legal requirements.53 But they also may be invoked in a contract
performance dispute context to bar modification of the terms of a government contract where the
officer alleged to have agreed to the modification lacked the requisite authority or was acting in
50

See, e.g. Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct.Cl. 115 (1953); 48 C.F.R.
§14.303(a); 48 C.F.R. § 14.304(a), (b)(1), (e), (f).
51

Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990) (immunity from
equitable estoppel); FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (same); compare, e.g. Gordon
Woodroffe Corp. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 984, 988 (Ct. Cl. 1952)(U.S. not bound by agent
acting without possessing actual authority), with id. at 988-989 (Madden, J., dissenting) (U.S.
should be bound by act done with apparent authority).
52
53

E.g. Gordon Woodroffe, 104 F. Supp. at 988.

Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990); Hercules, Inc. v.
United States, 516 U.S. 417, 426-427 (1996).
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violation of applicable legal requirements.54
Another example of an exceptionalist departures from the norms of private contracting
that affects both contract formation and contract performance and disputes pertaining thereto is
the heavy reliance on open-ended contractual vehicles such as task order contracting and other
forms of Indefinite Delivery- Indefinite Quantity (“IDIQ”) contracts, including the Multiple
Award and Single Award Schedules under the Federal Supply Schedules, to meet many of the
procurement needs of federal agencies today.55 These special contract vehicles can present
formation issues, because, at least in the case of the Multiple Award Schedules, private law
norms for consideration requisite to establish a binding contract do not appear to satisfied, yet a
private contractor is bound by its offer to supply scheduled items on the basis for which it is
scheduled. But the primary effect of such an award is to enable to government to call upon a
contractor, essentially at its unilateral discretion, to provide a level of service or goods,
determined unilaterally, on a schedule that is determined unilaterally. Thus these could be
viewed as departures from the norms of private contracting with respect to both the formation
and the performance of a contractual undertaking. The dramatic potential for the use and abuse
of such contract vehicles has been made much more visible to the public by the heavy reliance of
54
55

General Electric Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1215, 1218 & n.4 (Ct. Cl. 1969).

See John Cibinic & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., FORMA TION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
(George Washington Univ. 3d ed. 1998) (hereinafter “FORMATION”), at 1238-1252 ; Ralph C.
Nash, Jr., Steven L. Schooner & Karen R. O’Brien, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE
BOOK (George Washington Univ. 2d ed. 1998) (hereinafter “GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
REFERENCE BOOK”), at 243-244 (“Federal Supply Schedules”), 295-296 (“Indefinite-Delivery
Contract” and “Indefinite-Quantity Contract”), 355-365 (“Multiple Award Schedule”), 506-507
(“Task Order” and “Task Order Contract”); Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The
Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 AMER . U. L. REV . 627, ___-___ (2001).
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the United States on such instruments in the Iraq War of 2003-2004 and the rebuilding of Iraq.56
An additional important example of exceptionalism in the law of public contract
formation arguably is found in the deferential standard of review reflected in the
Scanwell/Steinthal doctrine, which allowed for judicial consideration of bid protests arising out
of the award of a federal government contract.57 Adoption of this deferential approach was
considered appropriate because of the highly technical nature of the procurement policy issues
involved, as well as the complexity of the pertinent legal structure, and the greater expertise of
agency procurement officials, and of the General Accounting Office (an available nonjudicial
protest forum), as compared to that of a reviewing court, in addressing these technical matters.58
As is noted in Part IIIC, this policy of deferential review is applied with special strength in the
context of military procurement.59 Of course, one might question whether the label
exceptionalism fits properly here, as the procurement choices of non-governmental purchasers
ordinarily would not be subject to any judicial review. Subjection of the government’s
56

Stephen L. Schooner, {Abu Ghraib piece, forthcoming ___Stanford Law and Policy J.
__ (2004)}; Christopher Yukins & Mohab Khattab, Iraqi Construction Awards Should Not be
Immune from Review, 80 FEDERAL CONTRACTS REPORT No. 18, 512-516 (Nov. 18, 2003); L.
Elaine Halchin, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN , CHARACTERISTICS,
AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES (Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2004), at 15-23.
57

M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1298-1299, 1300-1306 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Shoals American Industries, Inc. v. United States, 877 F.2d 883, 888-889 (11th Cir. 1989).
This standard of review, based on the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, now
has been made applicable to bid protests heard in the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. §
1491(b)(1) & (4). See also infra TAN ___-___ (regarding the especially deferential standard of
review to be applied in bid protests arising out of military procurement).
58

455 F.2d at 1300-1306.

59

See infra TAN ___-___.
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procurement decisions to judicial review, in and of itself, may properly be considered a
manifestation of reverse exceptionalism, which burdens the government and provides rights to a
would-be contractor. Adoption of the deferential standard of review for such judicial review
proceedings may best be viewed, then, as an accommodation between the reverse exceptionalist
values served by giving disappointed offerors the right to maintain a bid protest, and the
exceptionalist policies that serve the needs of the government to be free of harmful and intrusive
judicial second-guessing of its procurement policy decisions.
Other significant features of the federal procurement law governing contract formation,
may likewise be best understood as seeking to reconcile the special obligations that the
government bears in the contract formation process with exceptionalist policies and concerns.
Among these are rules and procedures superimposed upon the basic requirements of public
contract formation (themselves designed to assure transparently and competitive procurement for
the benefit of contractors and the public, imposing obligations on government agencies) that are
designed to afford procuring agencies additional flexibility in securing these objectives.
Salient in that category is the development of the process of competitive negotiation as an
alternative to sealed bidding as a procedure for undertaking open competitive procurement.60
Competitive negotiation is designed to allow transparent competitive procurement that
nonetheless affords agencies discretion to secure “best value” defined in terms of multiple
criteria, including qualitative measures in addition to price measures, rather than simply choosing

60

See Cibinic & Nash, FORMATION, supra note 55, at 709-967; Nash, Schooner &
O’Brien, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 55, at 107-108 (“Competitive
Proposals,” and “Competitive Range.”)
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the lowest price bid.61
Another significant accommodationist doctrine with this character is the development of
the cost-reimbursement contract.62 Cost reimbursement contracts enable the government to
contract on flexible financial terms that would, to say the least, be unusual in private contracts.
They are therefore appropriately regarded as exceptionalist accommodations. Essentially, the
government agrees in advance to pay the contractor its audited cost of performance, plus a profit
increment. Use of such flexible financial terms serves to allocate to the government the
unacceptably high risk associated with the performance of certain government contracts, which
call for cutting edge performances of unknown difficulty.

By allocating the risk that

performance will be unexpectedly difficult and expensive to the government, the government
seeks to induce contractors to make offers on work where the risks are too great to bid on a fixedprice basis, or where those offers would otherwise necessitate so large a risk premium built into
the fixed price as to make the contract more expensive than its actuarial cost.
In addition to the foregoing, there are public procurement-related doctrines in the United
States that defy ready categorization as bearing directly on contract formation, contract
performance, or on both, that nonetheless are marked by departure from the norms that govern
private contracts. These rules also are not so readily classifiable as either exceptionalist in the
pure sense defined here, or reverse exceptionalist in their operation. A distinguishing feature of
61

10 U.S.C. § 2305(a) & (b)(4)(criteria and procedures for awards in competitive
negotiation).
62

John Cibinic & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., COST REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTING (George
Washington Univ. 2d ed. 1993), passim; Nash, Schooner & O’Brien, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 55, at 146-147.
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this group of government contract doctrines is that they bear most directly on the rights and
immunities of government contractors as against parties other than the federal government.
Perhaps the leading example of such a rule, is the “government contractor defense”
doctrine established by Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.63 Boyle, which grows ultimately out
of the choice of law principles articulated in Clearfield Trust,64 establishes judge-made, federal
common law defense for certain federal government contractors, applicable to state tort law
claims brought against the contractor. Boyle holds that
liability for . . . defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law,
when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the [contractor] warned the United States about
dangers in the use of the equipment that were know to the [contractor] but not to the
United States.65
Note as well, that this departure from the tort norms that would surround an ordinarily private
contract arose in the context of military procurement and draws much of its rationale from the
policy considerations that discourage courts aggressive second-guessing of military procurement
decisions.66 Note as well that the rationale for extending immunity to a contractor in this
situation is based on the desire to protect the interests and prerogatives of the federal
government.67 In that sense the government contractor defense fits properly within the bounds of
the exceptionalist approach as defined here.

63

487 U.S. 500 (1988).

64

See supra TAN ___-___.

65

487 U.S. at 512.

66

See infra TAN ___-___.

67

487 U.S. at 504-509.
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A final example of this kind of exceptionalism is the derivative regulatory immunity
(against state regulation) that extends to federal government contractors where the imposition of
state regulation on the federal government contractor would interfere with federal procurement
policies.68 Plainly, in this case as well, the purpose of extending immunity to the contractor is to
protect the interests and policies of the federal government from state interference.69

D. The Incidence of Exceptionalism
This Article has now defined the phenomenon of exceptionalism in public procurement
law more precisely, distinguishing it from the reverse exceptionalism that characterizes much of
the United States law of government contract formation. The Article has also surveyed the
waterfront of significant examples of exceptionalism in settings pertaining to government
contract formation and government contract performance, as well as doctrines that cut across this
categorization, or which exists outside its categories. Based on this comprehensive survey, it is
now possible to assess the locus of the phenomenon of exceptionalism within the United States
law of public contracts.
True exceptionalism is primarily manifested in the law of public contract performance,
and only secondarily in the law of federal government contract formation and elsewhere in
government contracts law. This is significant, inter alia, for comparative law purposes because it

68

See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963) (federal milk supplier is exempt from
state minimum price laws because they would block the federal policy to secure the most
advantageous price through unconstrained price competition).
69

371 U.S. at 250-255.
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means that United States public procurement law is most strikingly exceptionalist with regard to
aspects of the procurement law system, broadly defined, that are not even considered an integral
part of the public procurement law system of the European Community or the systems of many
European and civil law countries, including, for instance, those of the United Kingdom and
Germany. Although a closer examination of the impact of the doctrines associated with
“administrative contracts” in many civil law nations may ultimately significantly qualify this
conclusion, the pattern discerned here suggests a strong contrast between the procurement law
regime of the United States and those of many other nations. In sum, where the United States
emphasizes “exceptionalism” in the law of public contract performance, the dominant European
law tendency emphasizes “congruence.” In Part III of this Article we propose and evaluate an
explanation for this divergence: the unusually strong role that military procurement has played in
the development of the United States public procurement system and legal doctrine.

III. Exceptionalism and the Centrality of Military Procurement
If we review the examples of exceptionalism noted in the previous section of this paper,
and examine the genesis of these exceptional rules, including both examples among the rules that
govern government contract performance and examples from the law of public contract
formation, it is striking how often the leading cases involve military procurement. Military
procurement disputes played a crucial role in the development of United States public
procurement law as midwife facilitating the birth of a highly exceptionalist regime of public
procurement law.
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In this section of this paper we initially address a significant question about the method
for presenting and demonstrating the power of this hypothesis. Next comes a brief historical
overview designed to confirm the centrality of military procurement throughout the history of
the United States’ procurement system. Finally, we turn to the key point, the evidence of the key
role played by military procurement in the emergence of an exceptionalist-oriented body of
public procurement law.

A. Comparative Analysis and a Note on Causation, Coincidence and Methodology
Perhaps this is as good a juncture as any to consider an important point that bears
importantly on any assessment of the causal hypothesis explored here: that military procurement
– and disputes and policy controversies arising therefrom – played a distinctive and important
role in the development of the exceptionalist thread in the United States’ law of public
procurement. To be sure, a comprehensive history of government procurement in the United
States by James Nagle confidently asserts at the very threshold that “[m]ilitary contracts
command center stage in any history of government procurement.”70 Read in context, of course,
it is reasonably clear that Jim Nagle’s assertion is meant to apply only to the history of
procurement in the United States, which is, after all, the subject of his book. Of course, it is also
true that, in the United States, regulation of defense and military procurement historically has
been at the center of development of the rules and procedures for procurement.71 The extension
70

James F. Nagle, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING (George Washington
University Press, 2d ed. 1999), 2.
71

This is documented in the next two sections of this Article, Parts IIIB and IIIC.
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of a comprehensive framework for transparent regulated public procurement to most civilian
procurement, was in the United States, a comparatively recent innovation (traceable to 1965).72
By contrast, it is apparent that differing approaches have been taken in and within the European
Union. For instance, Martin Trybus reported in his 1998 survey that in the European Union
“hard defence equipment” was excluded – at least in practice – from the Community’s internal
market and that accordingly there is no single market for hard defence equipment within the EU
and national governments still assume total control over this market.73 Moreover, he reports a
72

Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 614-615 (1980); Motor Coach Indus., Inc.
v. Dole, 725 F.2d 958, 966 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1984).
73

Martin Trybus, “National Models for the Regulation of the Acquisition of Armaments:
Toward a European Defence Procurement Code,” in Sue Arrowsmith & Arwel Davies, eds.,
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT : GLOBAL REVOLUTION (Kluwer Law Int’l, 1998), 71. See also {Martin
Trybus EUROPEAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT LAW : NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MODELS FOR
A LIBERALISED DEFENCE PROCUREMENT MARKET (Kluwer Law Int’l, 1999), Ch. 1; Arie Reich,
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW (Kluwer 1999), 200-201 (reporting some progress
in extending EU Directives to cover non-military specific goods bought for military purposes;
but otherwise military procurement remains exempt from the EU framework).
Trybus notes that hard defense material was excluded from the application of the EC
Treaty and the specialized EC procurement directives, at least in practice, by the broad
interpretation given the armaments exemption of Article 296(1)(b) of the EC Treaty by the
Member States. This broad interpretation of the Treaty’s armaments exception treated that
provision as a categorical exclusion of all hard defense material from the application of the
Treaty, dispensing with any requirement that application of the exemption be invoked and
justified in individual cases. However, since the judgment of the European Court of Justice in
{Case C-414/97, Commission v. Spain, [
] ECR ________}, it is clear that Article 296(1)(b)
of the EC Treaty will not be interpreted as a such a broad categorical exemption, and will need to
be specifically invoked and its application justified by the Member State seeking to bring itself
within application of the exception in a particular procurement. {Martin Trybus, “Procurement
for the Armed Forces: Balancing National Security with the Internal Market,” ___ European Law
Review ____ (2000).} Although the broad interpretation of the armaments exclusion apparently
continues to prevail in the practice of European Community Member States, the wording of the
armaments exclusion in the new European Community Public Procurement Directive appears to
accommodate the narrower interpretation given the Treaty exclusion in Commission v. Spain.
{quote/cite–Trybus?}
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striking diversity of approaches among major EU nations in this regard, ranging from France,
which applied a well-developed regulated approach to defense procurement, to Germany, which
applies a “formal procurement regime with detailed rules” to defense procurement, but which
treats these rules as “not generally enforceable,” all the way to the United Kingdom, which, he
reports, follows an unregulated approach to defense procurement in which “defence contracts are
not awarded according to fixed and legally binding contract award procedures.”74 The World
Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement provides in Article XXIII(1) a broad
right to exclude military procurement from the operation of that regime.75 So regulation of
military procurement is scarcely the norm in the advanced western economies. Similarly,
developing nations and those with economies somewhere in the transition from socialism to a
freer market often choose to exclude military procurement from the coverage of newly adopted
procurement law regimes as they move toward compliance with emerging international norms for
74

Id. at 76, 80, 82. See {Laurence Folliot-Lalliot, French Public Contracts, forthcoming
___West's International Government Contractor ___ (200x)} Part I, Chap. 1, Sec. 6 F (regarding
provisions of the new French Public Procurement Code permitting some defense contracts to be
excluded from the operation of the French Procurement Code where it is necessary to keep the
contract secret in the national interest; still coverage of military procurement under the Code is
the default norm).
75

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any party from taking any
action or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms,
ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for national
security or for national defence purposes.

Note the phrasing, which allows each government to be the judge of its own claim that it is
necessary for security or defense reasons to exempt such procurement from the operation of the
multilateral open regime created by the GPA. This language tracks a model employed, as well,
in other international agreements, including the GATT, GATS and TRIPS agreements.
{Citations.}
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transparent and competitive procurement.76 Indeed the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law
allows nations to exempt procurement affecting national security or defense from its
requirements for competitive regulated procurement.77 Thus, despite the sometimes United
States-centric perspective of legal observers on this, western, side of the Atlantic, it should not be
assumed that the creation of a procurement law regime on a template designed to accommodate
military procurement somehow reflects a universal constant or an international norm.
Still, even if the development of a procurement law that grew up around the needs of
military procurement is somewhat remarkable, viewed in comparative and historical perspective,
it is necessary to consider the alternative possibility that the salience of military procurement in
the cases that establish and define the exceptionalist character of much of United States’ public

76

The recently enacted Chinese Procurement Law provides in pertinent part:

Article 85: Urgent procurements carried out in the case of force majeure, including
serious natural disasters and other unavoidable situations, as well as procurements
involving state security and secrets shall not be governed by this law.
Article 86: The laws and regulations for military procurement shall be separately
formulated by the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party.
See, also Daniel Mitterhoff, BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE REFORM O F CHINA’S PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT REGIME (China-Mekong Law Center 2001), pp. 2, 30 (regarding Arts. 71 & 72 of
Oct. 2000 draft of proposed Government Procurement Law of the People’s Republic of China); J.
Schwartz, Learning from the United States’ Procurement Law Experience, 11 PUB. PROC. L.
REV . 115, 122-123 (2002).
77

UNCITRAL Article 1(2); see Robert R. Hunja, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services and Its Impact on Procurement Reform,” in
Sue Arrowsmith & Arwel Davies, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT : GLOBAL REVOLUTION , supra note
___, at 97, 99. Robert Hunja’s chapter is presented by Arrowsmith and Davies in the section of
their book devoted to public procurement reform in developing and transition economies.
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procurement law regime is largely a coincidence or historical artifact, rather than a distinctive
cause of the emergence of that exceptionalist tendency in the procurement law of the United
States. Indeed, precisely because so much of the procurement in the early years of the United
States’ history was military procurement, disputes arising in those cases were disproportionately
likely to have become the vehicle for deciding points of law that might equally apply in nonmilitary contexts. This might well have been so even if the fact that the test cases arose from
military procurement made no other difference to the outcome of the cases. The methodological
difficulty is compounded by the fact that there plainly is no direct way to test how the character
of United States procurement law might have emerged differently had it not engrossed military
procurement within its coverage.
As previously indicated, one way of evaluating the alternative “coincidence” hypothesis
would be to examine the procurement law of other nations to try to confirm the causal connection
between coverage of military procurement in a nation’s procurement law regime, and the
tendency to reflect what is labeled here as an exceptionalist approach. Understandably, a full
comparative law analysis that could confirm or disprove my hypothesis in this manner is well
beyond the scope of the present paper. On the other hand, it is my hope that, armed with the
model and the basis for comparison established here, others will undertake, either on a country
specific, or a multi-nation basis, the examination suggested here of the link between regulation of
military procurement and the emergence of a strong exceptionalist tendency within a particular
procurement law regime. Thus, ultimately, the materials necessary for undertaking a rigorous,
powerful and comprehensive comparative analysis on this point will be assembled. The author
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looks forward to returning to this subject as others have added to the corpus of materials
available for examining this hypothesis in comparative perspective.
For the present, however, the task of this article is pursued differently. The method
employed here, which focuses on the internal analysis of the operation and history of the United
States’ procurement law regime, is to demonstrate through careful analysis of seminal cases in
which exceptionalist doctrines emerged, the important role played by military procurement and
its regulation in the United States. More specifically, to counter the alternative “coincidence”
hypothesis noted above, it will be helpful to demonstrate that the exceptionalist doctrines were
developed, to a strikingly disproportionate degree, in cases involving military procurement. But
it will be equally, if not more important, to demonstrate that the military procurement context and
the compelling special policies that arise in that context contributed powerfully to the rationales
given for the decisions rendered in developing those exceptionalist doctrines. That is the
challenge undertaken here.

B. Centrality of Military Procurement in the United States
Just as this work cannot provide a comprehensive account of all of the doctrinal contours
of United States public procurement law without inflating into the proportions of a treatise, so
too, it cannot stand on its own as a history of the development of the public procurement system
in the United States.78 Fortunately for the author, and for the reader, Jim Nagle has provided us
with a fine history of that system, updated in 1999, that serves us well, in drawing conclusions
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See supra TAN ____.
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about the overall character of the United States’ procurement system and the role of military
procurement therein.79
As Nagle has concluded, “[m]ilitary contracts command central stage in any history of
government procurement” in the United States.80 And military contracting does indeed command
the center of the stage in his valuable history of United States federal public contracting. The
chapters of his work are structured to a substantial degree around successive eras of combat,
commencing in the pre-Revolutionary era with the French and Indian War, moving on the
Revolutionary War, followed by the War of 1812, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and
World War I, and on to World War II, and finally to the post-war era. Nor are these just handy
chronological units. An immersion in the historical materials such as that undertaken by Nagle
reveals that the war eras thrust striking and new challenges on the United States that produced
innovative responses in the management and regulation of public procurement. Some of the
issues changed over time in different eras, but it remained true that military procurement was
typically the main engine that drove forward the development of what gradually became a
sophisticated system of regulated public procurement. In the early history of the United States,
moreover, military procurement formed the heart of public procurement. It also drove the
beginnings of efforts systematically to regulate public procurement and the earliest efforts to
begin to create a norm of open competition and transparency. At each successive stage of the
development of federal government contracting practice and of its regulation, military

79

Nagle, supra note 24.
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Nagle, supra note 24, at 2.
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procurement was at the forefront of challenge and of innovation.
Nor was the salience of military procurement merely a historical constant. Rather, as
Nagle demonstrates, the themes, debates, and problems that recur throughout the history of
United States public procurement, are predominantly ones that emerge characteristically from
military procurement, or which emphasize its role. These include, significantly:
•

the mixed blessings associated with the emergence and power of a “military-industrial
complex,”

•

the problems of “profiteering “ and excessive profits in the shortage conditions of war
time,

•

the debates over the nationalization alternative to government contracting that take on
particular force in the presence of war time profit opportunities for contractors,

•

the ethical challenges aggravated by “revolving doors” and blending of private and public
interests and roles, between government and its contractors in private industry, which
swing all the more rapidly in war time and in its aftermath,

•

and, finally, the special need for and the special difficulty of achieving meaningful
competition when faced with the exigencies of mobilization for war or comparable
national crises.81

Nagle’s survey also shows that military contracting has been at the heart of the procedural story
of government contracting over the years. He asserts: “Much of the country’s contracting history
has been spent trying to find the best combination of three factors: the right contracting
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Nagle, supra note 24 at 5-7
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apparatus, the right government-contractor relationship, and the correct contract form itself.”82
The history he recounts, selectively noted below, shows that military procurement typically was
at the forefront of development in each of these areas. In sum, at every stage of public
procurement history, military procurement was at the heart of the most contentious issues as well
as the most innovative solutions.
Of course, Nagle acknowledges that “[f]ocusing” entirely “on wars and the military
would overlook a tremendous source of history.”83 Specifically, Nagle acknowledges that in
different eras of United States history civilian agencies engaged in development of essential new
infrastructure such as the Post Office Department and, later, the Bureau of Reclamation with its
program of dam construction, contributed substantially to the practice of government
contracting.84 Still, it would require a willful blindness to the main currents of United States
history to miss the fact that military and defense contracting has played the central role in
development of both the United States system of public procurement and the development of a
regulatory structure therefor. It is striking, moreover, that even the civilian examples offered by
Nagle generally reflect critical and extraordinary national efforts, essential to the development of
the new nation, and to further progress in succeeding eras, that confronted the United States with
challenges (and opportunities for technical, managerial, and legal innovation) comparable in
scope and importance to those presented by the exigencies of war time. Thus in recent eras we
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Id. at 7-8.
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Id. at 4.
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See, e.g. id. at 4-5, 57-60, 151-163, 168-170, 361-377.
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can think of the challenge of getting astronauts to stand on the moon, or some of the recent
national security tasks arising in the wake of the terrorist attack of 9/11/2001. (The latter, of
course, may in fact be considered, a part of, rather than a counter to, the pre-eminence of military
and defense tasks in the development of public procurement in the United States.) In summary
overview then, the largest part of the story of United States procurement and public procurement
law then, has been the development of military procurement and a legal framework for military
procurement, followed by the gradual extension of the norms of military public contracting to the
entire field of federal public contracting.
Fortunately, the propositions suggested here about the centrality of military procurement
in the development of the United States’ system are borne out by common sense and common
knowledge. They may, indeed, strike some readers as too obvious to warrant discussion or
elaborate proof. In any event, any comprehensive historical demonstration of the central role
played by military procurement in the development of the United States’ procurement system is
necessarily beyond the scope of this article, or any article.85 Relying heavily on Nagle’s useful
treatment, however, we can confidently conclude that military procurement has played a critical
role in the development and evolution of the federal public procurement regime of in the United
States. Moreover, this point is tellingly corroborated in the next section of this Article, which
surveys the role of military procurement in the emergence of significant exceptionalist doctrines
of procurement law.
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Nagle himself emphasizes that his history, which weighs in at over 600 pages, is itself
the product of the exercise of striking “selectivity.” Id. at 8-9.
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C. Military Procurement and Exceptionalism
In Part II of this Article, the author surveyed the public procurement law of the United
States in order to more rigorously to define and demonstrate the strongly exceptionalist character
of that body of law.

It was demonstrted, as well, that exceptionalism, as it has been defined

here, is significantly, but not exclusively, concentrated in the law governing performance of
federal public contracts as opposed to the law of federal government contract formation. In the
process of carrying out that doctrinal survey much evidence was adduced that will support the
other branch of the author’s thesis: that the salience of military procurement in the development
of the United States public procurement law regime has been a very substantial cause of the
emergence of the exceptionalist flavor of that body of procurement law. As is more
systematically demonstrated in this last portion of this Article, the strikingly importance of the
military role is reflected in exceptionalist doctrines pertaining to contract formation as well as
those pertaining to contract performance, and also in some doctrines that affect both areas or
which defy ready categorization into either category.
As in Part II of this Article, limitations of space make it necessary to be selective here.
This can be neither a comprehensive historical account, nor a complete doctrinal survey of
United States public procurement law. As a result, fuller accounts are offered of the
development of some of the most significant exceptionalist rules of United States public
procurement law, designed to test the hypothesis that military procurement has been a major
driver of the exceptionalist character of the system. Some of the most telling examples are
considered in this fashion, with other exceptionalist features of this body of law treated more
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summarily. Although this survey generally bears out the claim made here about the critical
importance of the inclusion of military procurement in explaining the exceptionalist character of
the body of United States public procurement law, some of the examples considered demonstrate
that the true picture is somewhat more complex. The willingness of United States courts and
legislators to recognize overriding considerations that justify departures from the norm of
congruence generally, and from specific rules of private contract law, is strongly correlated with
the role of military procurement. Recognition of overriding prerogatives for the sovereign as
contractor has been accentuated and potentiated by the consideration of disputes and policy
issues arising in the setting of military procurement. Although military procurement has thus
catalyzed the emergence of exceptionalism in United States public procurement law, the selective
survey presented here also demonstrates that recognition of special sovereign prerogatives has
not be limited to the sphere of military procurement. In some instances, such as the termination
for convenience doctrine, the special latitude initially granted to the government in a military
setting has come to transcend that setting. In other instances, such as the sovereign acts and
unmistakability doctrine, the compelling needs of military activities illustrate, but do not limit or
fully define the scope of the overriding sovereign priorities whose recognition produced
strikingly exceptionalist rules for federal public procurement.
Of course, the selective approach taken here invites other scholars to flesh out the work
begun here with more detailed study of additional exceptionalist elements in the body of United
States public procurement law, as well as to search further for congruence-oriented elements of
the corpus of public procurement law that emerged despite the influence of military procurement
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on the system. In addition, of course, as previously noted, it is hoped that the present study will
encourage other scholars to test the hypothesis articulated here against the history and doctrine of
government procurement law regimes in other nations and in transnational legal orders.
1. Termination for Convenience
The development of the United States’ government’s broad power of termination for
convenience over its public contracts offers a paradigmatic example of the role that military
procurement has played in the emergence of the strongly exceptionalist elements in the United
States’ public procurement law.86 Our legal story begins with one of the relatively unusual forays
of the Supreme Court of the United States into the area of public contracts and related legal
issues, the 1875 decision of the Court in United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co.87
In Corliss, the United States Navy Department had entered into contracts with the
plaintiff during the Civil War for the manufacture of certain machinery that the Navy expected to
employ in the prosecution of the war effort. As the Court tells it, “[t]he completion of the
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See supra note ___ and accompanying text.

91 U.S. 321 (1875). It appears that earlier in the development of federal public
contracts law such cases were more common than they have become in recent years and played a
more significant role on the Supreme Court docket. The Supreme Court thus played a more
central and less interstitial role in the development of public contract law in this early formative
period.
The author hesitates even to label Corliss Steam-Engine Co. a case about “public
contracts law” proper, for the lawfulness of the practice of termination for convenience was
assumed, rather than decided in the case, strictly speaking; the questions squarely presented in
Corliss Steam-Engine Co. related only to the authority of federal government officials to enter
into binding contracts on behalf of the United States. Still the language of the case is so
sweeping that the case has assumed precedential significance, and is widely regarded as
establishing the lawfulness of a broad reservation authority to terminate a federal public contract
for the convenience of the government, at least in a military setting.
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machinery contracted for having become unnecessary from the termination of the war, the
secretary [of the Navy], in the exercise of his judgment, under the advice of a board of naval
advisers, suspended the work.”88 Although the Court used the term suspension, there was
nothing temporary about the administrative action terminating a contract that by then had been
partially performed by the contractor. The contractor did not formally contest the lawfulness of
the termination, eschewing any argument that the termination effected a breach of its original
contract, but instead offered the government alternative proposals to settle the obligation of the
government for the work that had been done.89 The government accepted one of the contractor’s
suggestions for terms of a settlement and agreed to the sum to be paid the contractor. However,
because the Navy did not then have sufficient appropriated funds on hand to pay the full amount
of the settlement agreement, it stipulated therein that only partial payment would be made
immediately upon delivery of the partially completed equipment, with further payments to be
made when, and only if, further appropriations covering this obligation became available from
Congress.90
88

Id. at 323.

89

The contractor offered either to keep the partially manufactured machinery and a
payment of $150,000, or to deliver the incomplete equipment to the government coupled with a
payment to it of $259,068. Id. at 321.
90

Id. at 322. Note that this stipulation, which follows the model of what today would be
called a “funds available,” “funds availability” or “availability of funds” clause generally is
necessary, even today, whenever the funds called for by a contract exceed available
appropriations, to avoid a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(B). See,
e.g. C.H. Leavell & Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 878 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (interpreting a funds
availability clause); 48 C.F.R. § 32.705-1(a) (mandating Availability of Funds Clause); 48 C.F.R.
§ 52.232-18 (prescribing language for Availability of Funds Clause.)
Even absent the clause from a contract, the Appropriations Clause of the United States
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The machinery was delivered in accordance with this settlement agreement, but the
contractor found it necessary to sue the government for damages in the Court of Claims to
recover the compensation owing under the settlement agreement91 The issue raised on appeal
before the Supreme Court was whether the Secretary of the Navy had the requisite authority to
enter into a binding contract of settlement with the contractor in this situation. Arguing a
position that would have disserved the government’s long-run interests in establishing its
procurement authority and general power to contract, the government defended its refusal to pay,
asserting that authority was lacking to enter into a binding agreement of this kind. Fortunately,
the government lost this battle, thereby winning “the war” and establishing both the broad
authority of executive branch agencies to enter into binding contracts, for procurement as well as
for settlement of procurement disputes, as well as the legitimacy of the practice of termination for
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, cl.7, would raise a bar to payment not covered by a valid and
applicable statutory appropriation. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,
424-434 (1990). However, if funds did not become available and such a clause were absent from
the contract, the United States would be left in the posture of breaching its contract with no
remedy available to the contractor. The funds availability clause thus makes transparent the
government’s exceptional defense to payment on its contracts arising from the Appropriations
Clause by warning the contractor of the salient pre-condition that limits the government’s
undertaking to pay its obligation.
Of course, one might think that the very idea of conditioning the government’s
undertaking to pay on the discretionary decision of a future Congress to appropriate funds would
render the contract illusory, but this has never been the law. As a private contracting party
almost certainly could not so condition its obligation to pay so broadly without rendering its
contract unenforceable, the complex of doctrines associated with the Appropriations Clause, the
Anti-Deficiency Act, and Funds Availability Clauses reflects a significant exceptionalist element
in federal public contracts law. It affects both the formation and performance of such federal
public contracts.
91

Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. at 321. Apparently, moreover, the necessary funds
were appropriated because the government did not defend its non-payment by relying on the
Funds Availability Clause that had been inserted in the settlement agreement.
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convenience, at least in this military context.
The Court’s language is emphatic, and unqualified, making clear the importance of the
military context to the result reached. In deciding the question of authority to contract, the Court
noted both the generic grant of authority to the Navy Department to procure naval stores and
equipment, and the more specific grants of statutory authority and legislative appropriations for
making such purchases specifically for the prosecution of the Civil War to put down “the
rebellion.”92 This authority was vested in the Secretary of the Navy, moreover, under the
direction of the President, and it extended not only to “enter[ing]” into procurement “contracts
for public service,” initially, but also to suspending such contracts, where appropriate, and
entering into binding contracts of settlement resulting from such terminations:93 “As, in making
the original contracts, he must agree upon the compensation to be made for their entire
performance, it would seem, that, when those contracts are suspended by him, he must be equally
authorized to agree upon the compensation for their partial performance.”94 It seems fair to
conclude that the military context, and the obvious necessity for this kind of exercise of the
contracting power, helped to persuade the Court that the statutory power to contract existed here.
The Court explained:
the discharge of the duty devolving on the secretary [of the Navy] necessarily requires
him to enter into numerous contracts for public service; and the power to suspend work
contracted for, whether in the construction, armament, or equipment of vessels of war,
when from any cause the public interest requires such suspension, must necessarily rest
92

Id. at 322, 323.
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Id. at 322.
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Id. at 322-323.

Centrality of U.S. Military Procurement (Draft 10/17/04), page 59

with him.95
But if the military context is only subtly invoked as a factor in the Court’s analysis of the power
of the Secretary to enter into binding contracts (both generally, and specifically, as to termination
settlement contracts), the importance of the military context is declared in ringing tones, with
respect to the question of the legitimacy of a termination for convenience:
95

Id. at 322. A generation before Corliss Steam-Engine Co., in United States v. Tingey,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115 (1831), the Supreme Court had decided that the United States has the
inherent power to enter into contracts in order to carry out its constitutional responsibilities and
its other powers, notwithstanding the absence of a textual grant of the authority to enter contracts
in the Constitution and the absence of an express statutory grant of that power. That case, like
Corliss Steam-Engine Co., arose out of a contract in a military setting– a fidelity bond that Lewis
Deblois was required to post as a condition of his holding office as a Navy purser. The Court
strongly affirmed that “the United States have such a capacity to enter into contracts,” that
authority being
an incident to the general right of sovereignty; and the United States being a body politic,
may, within the sphere of the constitutional powers confided to it, and through the
instrumentality of the proper department to which those powers are confided, enter into
contracts not prohibited by law, and appropriate to the just exercise of those powers. . . .
To adopt a different principle, would be to deny the ordinary rights of sovereignty . . . .
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 128. Unlike Corliss Steam-Engine Co., the Court’s opinion in Tingey does not
permit us to conclude that the military setting was critical to the outcome. Even so, however,
because of the pre-eminence of military contracting in the activities of the United States in the
early post-constitutional period, it is not accidental that the seminal case about the federal
government’s constitutional and statutory power to contract arose from a dispute about a
mundane bond contract in a military context.
Although Tingey takes an expansive view of federal power in the area of contracting,
extending that power beyond the literal limits of the applicable constitutional and statutory texts,
it also could be said to reflect a significant and distinctive application of a congruence-oriented
approach, rather than an exceptionalist approach. Specifically, the Court infers that the federal
government possesses a power and capacity that ordinary natural persons enjoy: an inherent
power to enter into contracts. In the constitutional setting of the case, the arguably germane
“exceptional” distinguishing feature of the federal government was its status as a government of
limited powers, expressly delegated. Tingey thus enhances federal government power by
employing a formally congruence-oriented approach.
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Contracts for the armament and equipment of vessels of war may, and generally do,
require numerous modifications in the progress of the work, where that work requires
years for its completion. With the improvements constantly made in ship-building and
steam-machinery and in arms, some parts originally contracted for may have to be
abandoned, and other parts substituted; and it would be of serious detriment to the public
service if the power of the head of the Navy Department did not extend to providing for
all such possible contingencies by modification or suspension of the contracts, and
settlement with the contractors.96
This is a forceful seminal statement of the factors that have made military procurement and the
disputes and policy matters arising therefrom an engine for the development of exceptionalism in
the law of federal government procurement in the United States. The legitimacy of the
government’s revising of its contractual commitments was considered obvious both because of
the inherently uncertain changing fortunes of war, and because of the technically progressive
nature of the production of military equipment. Indeed, the latter rationale appears to have
entailed a pioneering judicial recognition of the special nature of what we might today call high
technology procurement. In addition to these two factors that explain much of the recurring
contribution of military procurement to the development of exceptionalist procurement law
doctrine, a third reason for taking this highly exceptionalist approach is more subtly reflected in
the Court’s opinion, as well. That additional factor, also a recurring motif of the exceptionalist
cases and doctrines arising from military procurement, is the important value of deferring to the
expert judgment of those charged by law with making decisions regarding military matters. The
Court explained that, the “completion of the machinery contracted for having become
unnecessary from the termination of the war, the secretary, in the exercise of his judgment, under
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Id. at 323.
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the advice of a board of naval officers, suspended the work.”97 This early invocation of
principles we might today call deferential review appears to have drawn part of its force from the
Court’s unquestioning assumption that it was especially unqualified to second-guess the
assessment by the military officials as to the changed circumstances that they had determined
were sufficient to warrant termination of the contract.98
Corliss Steam-Engine Co. thus testifies powerfully to the particularized impact of the
military context of procurement on the development of exceptionalist doctrine. But this point is
cast in more striking relief when we compare Corliss with the decision a mere 44 years later in
United States v. Purcell Envelope Co.99 Purcell Envelope establishes, in effect, one of the
leading congruence-influenced doctrines concerning federal government contract formation: that
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Id. (emphasis added).
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Note that the influential decision in Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840),
reflects the powerful reluctance of the courts, in the nineteenth century, to allow judicial review
even of ministerial administrative action. The Court declared emphatically:
The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive
departments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are
quite satisfied that, that such a power was never intended to be given to them.
Id. at 516. The remarkable fact is that the executive action so zealously guarded against
mischievous judicial review by the Decatur Court, was the failure to pay a widow’s pension
granted by statute, and judicial review did not appear in this context particularly likely to trench
upon sensitive executive judgments. However, the case involved a claim to a military widow’s
pension; the claimant was in fact the widow of early American naval hero, Stephen Decatur.
The Decatur Court’s seemingly inexplicable overstatement of the dangers of opening the door to
judicial review may well reflect the special reluctance to question executive judgments in
contexts even weakly related to military concerns, that we see as well in the 1831 decision in
Tingey and the 1875 decision in Corliss Steam-Engine..
99

249 U.S. 313 (1919).
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a contractor’s offer, coupled with an acceptance effectuated by a governmental official
possessing the requisite authority results in a contract binding on the United States.100 The case
arose when the Post Office Department solicited bids for a requirements contract to supply it
with stamped envelopes for a four year term. Although the government had accepted Purcell’s
bid after having determined that it met applicable standards of responsibility, it subsequently
attempted to revoke that acceptance and cancel the contract. The attempted revocation occurred
after a new Postmaster General took office and in response to the unfavorable results of a
reinvestigation of Purcell’s financial soundness that had been ordered by the new Postmaster
upon his assuming his office. In holding that the government was bound by its acceptance of
Purcell’s offer, the Court rejected the government’s argument that the new Postmaster General
had a “quasi-judicial” power “to review and set aside the decision of his predecessor, 101
declaring that offer and acceptance yielded a binding contract:
We are unable to concede the fact or the power asserted to be dependent upon it. There
must be a point of time at which discretion is exhausted. The procedure for the
advertising for bids for supplies or services to the Government would else be a mockery - a procedure, we may say, that is not permissive but required (§ 3709, Rev. Stats.). By it
the Government is given the benefit of the competition of the market and each bidder is
given the chance for a bargain. It is a provision, therefore, in the interest of both
Government and bidder, necessarily giving rights to both and placing obligations on both.
And it is not out of place to say that the Government should be animated by a justice as
anxious to consider the rights of the bidder as to insist upon its own. And, we repeat,
there must be some point at which discretion ceases and obligation takes its place. . . . .
Upon the invitation, in accordance with law, of Postmaster General Gary, the Envelope
Company and eleven others submitted bids. The Envelope Company was the lowest
bidder and after the Company had been found upon investigation to be financially
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Id. at 317-318, 319-320.
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Id. at 318-319.
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responsible its bid was accepted by entry of a formal order.102
The Purcell Court, in a routine civilian procurement, can find no reason to depart from the
private law regime in which an acceptance of an offer yields a binding contract. Indeed, the
Court lectures the government as to why the competitive mechanisms of government
procurement make it all the more important that the government was bound by its acceptance.
Thus Purcell reflects congruence, compounded with the “positive exceptionalism,” previously
noted, that imposes extra obligations on the government in favor of its contractors, especially in
the contract formation process.103 In this routine civilian procurement contract setting, despite
the adverse results of the new Postmaster General’s intervening re-investigation of the
contractor’s financial standing and responsibility, the Court is unwilling or unable to recognize
any legally sufficient basis for allowing , to allow the government the power to revise or avoid its
contracts.104
Although the contrast between any two cases may, of course, be misleading, or explained by
other factors, the dramatically opposed approaches taken in Corliss Steam-Engine Co. and in
Purcell Envelope is strong evidence of the distinctive impact of the military procurement context
on the the development of exceptionalism in United States public procurement law.
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Id.
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See TAN ___-___.

104

If the acceptance had not been effectuated by an official with actual authority to bind
the United States, then exceptionalism would have come in to play in the form of the
government’s immunity from equitable estoppel, and the related rule that an exercise of apparent
authority does not bind the United States. See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
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The powerful impact of the military setting of the seminal termination for convenience
case, explaining the expansive reception given to this assertion of authority there is further
corroborated by the important opinion of the Court of Federal Claims in Torncello v. United
States,105 noted previously.106 Judge Bennett’s exhaustive opinion emphasizes that the
termination for convenience doctrine was invented in the context of military procurement, was
limited, for 75 years, to war-time military procurement, and was not applied to civilian
procurement for almost a century.107 As Judge Bennett explained: “From the Corliss decision in
1876 to the last use of the World War II convenience termination clause in early 1944, the legal
basis of the government's power had always been that the great and unpredictable circumstances
of war necessitated some ability to halt useless contracts and settle with the contractors.” 108
105

681 F.2d 756 (1982). Although Torncello has been superseded as precedent by
Krygoski Construction Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1210 (1997), Judge Bennett’s opinion for the court in Torncello remains a uniquely careful
record of the history of the development of the termination for convenience doctrine, and an
important sign post as to its proper scope. It is also true that Judge Bennett’s opinion for the 6
member court was substantially undermined, both by Judges Davis and Nichols, who concurred
only in the judgment in Torncello, and by the separate opinion of Judge Friedman. Torncello,
681 F.2d at 773-774. As the Krygoski court subsequently noted (94 F.3d at 1541-1542 & n.1),
Judge Friedman’s opinion, formally designated a concurring opinion, rather than one concurring
only in the judgment, nonetheless reads more like the latter; on this basis the Krygoski court
questioned whether Judge Bennett’s opinion in Torncello may properly be considered a majority
opinion for the court. Nevertheless, nothing in Krygoski impeaches Judge Bennett’s historical
account of the evolution of termination for convenience, which is its only relevance for present
purposes. Indeed, Krygoski independently underscores the key role played by military
procurement in the development of the termination for convenience doctrine. 94. F.3d at 15401541.
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Moreover, when the doctrine was expanded to apply to civilian and peacetime military
procurement, it was allowed a more narrower scope. Despite the broader literal scope of
contractual termination for convenience clauses, when “[w]ar was . . . absent” from the situation,
the Court of Claims “allow[ed] termination for convenience only when” there was some
unforeseeable objective “change in the circumstances” that departed from the “expectations of
the parties” to the contract.109 It is only with the 1996 decision of the Federal Circuit in Krygoski
that a differential approach to termination for convenience in military and civilian cases appears
to have been abandoned.110 Even today, under the deferential “abuse of discretion” test
articulated in Krygoski111, it is likely that an abuse of discretion in instituting termination for
convenience is less likely to be found in a military procurement case than in a civilian one. The
policy considerations given in Corliss Steam-Engine Co. have retained their force: the
changeability of the military needs on the demand side, the technical progressiveness of many of
the objects of military procurement that drives changing specifications and needs on the supply
side, and the understandable inclination of civilian judges to defer strongly to expert military
judgments. As we shall see, these factors have application in many contexts outside the
termination for convenience doctrine, driving the exceptionalist approach taken by the courts and
policymakers.
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Id. It is this requirement of an objective change in the circumstances that has been
revised by the subsequent decision in Krygoski (see supra note ____), which applies a more
expansive formulation as to the proper availability of termination for convenience.
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2. The G.L. Christian Doctrine
A second illustration of an exceptionalist doctrine that suggests the impact of military
procurement on the development of the exceptionalist character in United States public
procurement law is the G.L. Christian doctrine.112 As noted above, that doctrine teaches that
standardized government contracts clauses that should have been included in a federal
procurement contract under the applicable regulations, but which were omitted from the contract
because of human error, should nonetheless be read into any contracts from which the language
was mistakenly omitted.113 The clause that was mistakenly omitted in G.L. Christian, the
seminal case, was, moreover, the required termination for convenience clause. The attempted
termination for convenience was of a contract to construct a large military housing complex at
Fort Polk, Louisiana. The termination was prompted by a decision to deactivate Fort Polk itself
as a result of the reassessment of the nation’s military needs and the best way in which to allocate
limited resources to serve those needs.114 The Court was emphatic about the importance of the
government’s right of termination for convenience in the context of military contracts of this
kind, and did not hesitate to conclude that the missing contractual clause should be read into the
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See supra TAN 24-25 and accompanying notes.
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G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 419 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965).
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contract.115 The rationale for the court’s decision, set out in the margin, fairly shouts out the
critical role played by the military procurement context. Moreover, the court was equally clear

115

The Court of Claims explained in considerable detail (312 F.2d at 426-427; citations
and footnote omitted):
We are not, and should not be, slow to find the standard termination article
incorporated, as a matter of law, into plaintiff's contract . . . . The termination
clause limits profit to work actually done, and prohibits the recovery of
anticipated but unearned profits. That limitation is a deeply ingrained strand of
public procurement policy. Regularly since World War I, it has been a major
government principle, in times of stress or increased military procurement, to
provide for the cancellation of defense contracts when they are no longer needed,
as well as for the reimbursement of costs actually incurred before cancellation,
plus a reasonable profit on that work -- but not to allow anticipated profits. In
World War I, there was the Act of June 15, 1917. 40 Stat. 182, and the Dent Act
of 1919, 40 Stat. 1272, both of which were held to prevent awards of prospective
or possible profits. In World War II, the termination provisions used by the war
contracting agencies (at least since late 1941) uniformly disallowed anticipated
profits. The same policy against unearned profits was embodied in the Contract
Settlement Act (Act of July 1, 1944, 58 Stat. 649), Section 6(d)(5) of which
directed war contracting agencies, in settling terminated contracts, to award "such
allowance for profit on the preparations made and work done for terminated
portions of the war contract as is reasonable under the circumstances"; the
regulation issued by the Office of Contract Settlement specifically limited profit to
preparations made and work done (32 C.F.R., 1944 Supp., Sec. 8006.3(c), p.
3065). Similarly, the Lucas Act of August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 902, authorizing the
departments and agencies "to consider, adjust, and settle equitable claims of
contractors," limited the amount of the claim to "losses (not including diminution
of anticipated profits) incurred * * *." Since World War II, the standard
termination clauses promulgated by the Defense Department and its constituent
agencies have taken the same tack. Literally thousands of defense contracts and
subcontracts have been settled on that basis in the past decades.
This history shows, in our view, that the Defense Department and the Congress
would be loath to sanction a large contract which did not provide for power to terminate
and at the same time proscribe anticipated profits if termination did occur. Particularly in
the field of military housing, tied as it is to changes and uncertainties in installations,
would it be necessary to take account of a possible termination in advance of completion,
and to guard against a common law measure of recovery which had been disallowed for
so many years in military procurement.
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that the military context established that it was reasonable to charge the contractor with
knowledge of the government’s conventional right to terminate for convenience, because of its
status as an “experienced contractor” on projects of this kind.116 Today the G..L. Christian
doctrine is regarded as a bright-line rule applicable to all federal government procurement
contracts.117 But there can be little doubt that the military procurement context played at least the
role of midwife–if not the role of father or mother– in the birth of this rule. This then is a case in
which a case arising out of military procurement and the special policies applicable thereto
catalyzed the emergence of an exceptionalist doctrine that was given application even outside its
original military procurement context.118
3. The Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines
The development of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine provides a third, albeit subtler,
illustration of the influence of disputes and cases arising out of military procurement on the
emergence of a powerful exceptionalist norm in United States public procurement law.119 The
present author has previously written at considerable length, describing the evolution of that
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Id. at 427.
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Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS , supra note 5, at {123}.
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It does not appear that limitation of the doctrine to the military procurement context
was ever seriously urged or considered. But this does not undercut the argument made here;
rather it demonstrates the degree to which military procurement cases have formed the template
for the development of generic public procurement law doctrine in the United States.
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doctrine and only the highlights need be rehearsed here.120 Briefly, the sovereign acts doctrine
operates to excuse the government of the United States from breach of contract liability where
“public and general” acts undertaken in the performance of its sovereign responsibilities might
otherwise constitute a breach of contract. Cases decided under the doctrine include ones where
the government has acted in a manner that burdens or magnifies the contractual obligations of the
government’s contracting partner, the contractor.121 But they also include cases in which the
government has acted directly to repudiate its own promise of performance.122
The Sovereign Acts Doctrine’s operation often can be understood as that of a canon of
interpretation for government contracts.123 So viewed, it is a canon that dictates that neither the
government’s express undertakings nor its implied obligations to cooperate with its contractors
should be construed to make promises so unconditional that they are not subject to being
superseded by public and general governmental actions that might, of necessity, have the
incidental effect of undercutting the contract. Read as a canon of contractual interpretation, this
presumption is subject to being overcome by contractual language that is sufficiently clear and
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See Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1, passim. See especially, id.. at
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E.g. Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865), appeal dismissed, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
145 (1870); Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383 (1865).
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Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925).

Schwartz, PROCUREMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 5, at {175-176};
Schwartz, Assembling Winstar , supra note 1, at ___.
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unmistakable to override the presumption.124 So viewed, the sovereign acts doctrine may best be
understood as a canon of avoidance that enables a court to avoid the conclusion that the
government’s sovereign duties and its contractual undertakings have come into irreconcilable
conflict.125 On the other hand, in some contexts and in some applications the doctrine cannot
easily be understood as a canon of construction of the government’s bargain, and may better be
viewed as simply excusing what would otherwise be a culpable breach.126 Without recapitulating
all of the nuances of this doctrine and its development, it is worthwhile here to note some key
features of the two cases (Deming and Jones) in which the doctrine was devised by the United
States Court of Claims, predecessor to today’s Court of Federal Claims, and the Horowitz
decision, in which the Supreme Court subsequently put its imprimatur on the doctrine. The facts
of these cases show that the court were more readily able to understand the need to protect
sovereign authority against contractual infringement in these cases because of the military
procurement context and related contexts that made protection of sovereign authority a
particularly compelling value in the cases. Once again, the special strength of sovereign
124

Schwartz, Assembling Winstar, supra note 1, at _____; Schwartz, Wake of Winstar,
supra note 1 at ____.
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This formulation of the sovereign acts doctrine as a rebuttable canon of construction to
be used in interpreting government contracts the performance of which is adversely impacted by
subsequent public and general acts of the government, highlights the near identity of purpose and
effect between this doctrine and he historically distinct unmistakability and reserved powers
doctrines. The present author has discussed this overlap in Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra
note 1, at ___, and the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to recognize this overlap in Assembling
Winstar, supra note 1, at ____, and in Wake of Winstar, supra note 1 at ____.
126
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prerogatives in contexts related to military needs and decision-making, and the reluctance of the
courts to second guess authorized military decision-makers was a powerful influence on the
outcome. On the other hand, these cases also show that the courts recognized that strong
protection of sovereign power included, but was not limited to, the context of military
procurement. There were other contexts in which the claims of sovereignty were regarded as
comparably strong, or nearly so. Still, a balanced assessment of the legacy of these cases will
show the strong impact of military procurement in engendering the flexible jurisprudence of our
exceptionalist body of public procurement law. Moreover, we shall see that recent cases in
which the Supreme Court at least arguably has taken a somewhat more restrictive approach to the
Sovereign Acts Doctrine and/or the related Unmistakbility Doctrine have arisen in civilian and
regulatory contracting contexts which, the Court perceived there to be no comparably compelling
need to protect the exercise of sovereign authority. So here military procurement and protection
of military decision-makers plainly assisted at the birth of the exceptionalist doctrines, which
then carried over to other, non-military contexts. However, the vigor with which these
exceptionalist doctrines are applied is today somewhat less when the strongest claims and
prerogatives of sovereignty are not threatened– outside the military procurement context.
In 1865, in its very first Term and in the first volume of its official reporter, the newly
established United States Court of Claims decided Deming v. United States,127 and Jones v.
United States,128 the pair of seminal cases. Note the date, at the end of the United States’ Civil
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War.
The first of these cases, Deming, arose from a series of contracts to provide rations for the
Marine Corps during the first few years of the Civil War. The contractor made a claim in the
newly available Court of Claims asserting that the government had breached these contracts,
initially by imposing certain tariff duties on imports that increased the price to the contractor of
acquiring the rations the contractor was obligated to provide. An additional breach was claimed
to result from the enactment of the Legal Tender Act of 1862,129 which provided for the issuance
of paper United States currency that was valid for the payment of obligations though not backed
by a reserve of gold.130 The contractor asserted that this second legislative act likewise had the
effect of increasing its cost of performing its contractual obligations. The Court of Claims
rejected the contractor’s assertion that “by these enactments the United States have changed, and
in effect imposed new conditions upon the peformance of their contracts.”131 Because the
government was engaged in “exercising its sovereign power of providing laws for the welfare of
the State,” and because “[t]he statute[s] “bear[] upon [the government’s contract] as [they] bears
upon all similar contracts between citizens, and affect[s] it in no other way,” the enactment of the
statutes could not be considered a breach of the government’s contractual undertaking.132
The court’s explanation of its holding is laconic to a fault, and no clear indication is given
129

12 Stat. 345.
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The enactment of the Legal Tender Act was made necessary by the exigencies and the
expenses of the Civil War. See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, ___ (1870).
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as to the reach of the principle that is invoked, leaving many important questions unresolved for
future cases.133 Accordingly, although the particular contract involved in this seminal case was a
military procurement contract, it is impossible to discern with any certainty whether that was
important to the outcome reached. What is unmistakably clear is the court’s utter confidence that
“general enactments of Congress” are not to be “construed as evasions of [a] particular
contract.”134 And it seems fair to report that, in this terse opinion, marginally greater emphasis is
laid upon the threat that the claim presents to the “sovereign right of enacting laws,” than on any
other factor.135 In other words, the contractor’s claim that its contract had indirectly been
violated threatened to trench upon a core exercise of sovereign authority: the legislative power of
Congress. Surely this warranted the exceptionalist doctrine that resulted. Yet the fact remains
that Deming was a case of military procurement, which spawned what became a far-reaching
assertion of exceptional prerogatives for the government. Deming’s defense of a “sovereign right
of enacting laws” that cannot be forfeited by the conduct of the government’s contracting is
assuredly a defense of the key prerogatives of sovereignty. 136 But the court’s conclusion that the
“United States as contractor are not responsible for the United States as lawgiver” simultaneously
serves to vindicate the importance of the contracting function.137
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See Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 1, at 653-665 (exploring the
ambiguities and unresolved issues).
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The underlying message of Deming, the seminal case, thus is that enforceable government
procurement contracts and the integrity of sovereign power must be made to co-exist, because
both are of first-rank importance. They are made to co-exist by a doctrine that strongly
discourages interpretation of a government procurement contract as promising that government
contracts will not be adversely affected by the enactment of intervening generically applicable
statutes. The extent to which Deming served as a vindication of the government’s contracting
function is most apparent if one considers the probable consequences that would have followed
had the court reached the opposite decision in Deming and similar cases. Failure to embrace the
sovereign acts doctrine principle invented in Deming would have presented the government with
a dilemma. The government could risk being significantly restricted in its regulatory and
legislative authority once it had entered into a web of contracts that could not (without
contractual liability) be burdened or impaired by such general legislation. Alternatively, the
government would have to forego the substantial benefits of being able to secure goods and
services available through the market. It is plain, at least from our vantage point of hindsight,
that neither option would have been tolerable. Moreover, although no single case can suffice to
prove this point, it is suggested that the importance of reconciling the government contracting
function with the exercise of its sovereign regulatory powers gained much of its plausibility and
appeal, from the outset, from the military subject matter of the contracts involved in Deming.
Moreover, the strong association between the government procurement function and the military
context was inescapable giving the timing of the contracts and the litigation over them, in the
time of the Civil War. The performance of military procurement contracts such as those at issue
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in Deming was both innately important, and inherently susceptible of running afoul of the
enactment of such generic legislation as the tariff and currency statutes that gave rise to the
claims in that case.
If Deming suggests that assertion of sovereign prerogatives is supported by, but not
limited to the military procurement context, Jones, the successor case, more clearly demonstrates
the impact of military procurement and exigencies in fostering exceptionalism. In Jones it was
not the contracts that were military, technically, but the governmental “interference” that
allegedly burdened the contractor’s performance was caused by military operations and military
decisions that the court was loathe to second guess. The claim in Jones arose out of a contract to
with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to survey certain lands described in treaties between the
United States and certain Indian nations. Understood in historical context, this may, in fact, be
properly regarded as a contract closely tied to military operations. More striking, however, is that
the plaintiff’s claim was that their required contractual performance for the government had been
rendered more difficult and expensive by the actions of the government. What actions? Plaintiff
claimed that by withdrawing army troops from certain particular military posts in Indian country,
in asserted violation of the treaties involved, the United States had rendered more difficult and
expensive the performance of its contractual undertaking.138 The Court of Claims responded
sharply to what it plainly took to be the plaintiff’s hubris, explaining: “Whatever acts the
government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general,
cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into
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which it enters with private persons.”139 The Court plainly sought to, and did, articulate a generic
principle to shield the United State from claims of this kind, which would subordinate
sovereignty to an inflated and unrealistic version of contractual undertakings, expressed and
implied. Still it seems fair to conclude that the fact pattern impressed upon the court the need for
such protection. The Court surely would have considered the plaintiff’s invitation judicially to
review the decisions of the United States concerning stationing of troops and authorizing troop
movements, made in the course of the Indian Wars, to be unthinkable. Again the military
context made clear the importance of protecting sovereignty, generically. But the military
context also made especially plain the inappropriateness of the sought-for exercise of judicial
review and the intrusive impact on government decision-making that would have resulted from
entertaining this claim.
The impact of military considerations, if not military procurement per se, on the
acceptance of the exceptionalist principles of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine was underscored
further when the Supreme Court of the United States endorsed and indeed broadened the
application of the sovereign acts doctrine in Horowitz v. United States.140 If Deming and Jones
(like Corliss Steam-Engine Co.) were products of the Civil War and the Indian Wars, Horowitz
was an artifact of World War I and its aftermath. A federal agency, the Ordnance Salvage Board,
had in 1919 contracted to sell the plaintiff certain silk in the government’s possession that
evidently had become surplus, in the wake of the end of the war. Although the agency
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contractually promised to ship the surplus silk with a day or two of receipt of the purchaser’s
order, it was unable to do so when the shipping instructions were received. Timely performance
was blocked by an embargo on non-essential shipments imposed by another federal agency, the
United States Railroad Administration. The plaintiff sought damages for the loss that it incurred
when shipping was thus delayed and it was unable to resell the silk at the high price prevailing at
the time of the order to ship the silk that had been dishonored by the government.141 Although
the decision went beyond the circumstances of Deming and Jones in that the government had
dishonored its own promise, rather than simply burdening the exercise of the contractor’s
undertakings, the Horowitz court simply invoked Deming and Jones as controlling.142 Although
the Court does not specifically cite any military necessity for the regulatory rail embargo, or for
the sale of surplus military property itself, the significance of the military context is suggested by
the facts. As in Deming it appears a balanced conclusion to state here simply that recognition of
the sovereign prerogative (to regulate use of the rails in the public or national interest) was
dramatically illustrated by the factual context. Military procurement (or surplus equipment sales)
served simply to illustrate effectively the importance of shielding the exercise of the sovereign
authority from restrictions implied from a government commercial undertaking.
The sovereign act doctrine cases should be read to teach that the courts’ embrace of
exceptionalist rules of government contracting was advanced by the context of military
procurement or surplus equipment sale. And where entertaining a contractual claims would
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have entailed judicially reviewing the justification for a military decision, the court have been
particularly forthcoming about protecting sovereign prerogatives against restraints on the
exercise of sovereign authority that otherwise might be inferred from the operation of the
government’s contractual undertakings. But the protection of sovereign authority surely was not
limited to the context of military procurement or interference through judicial review with
military decisionmaking.
In recent years, as the Supreme Court arguably has cut back somewhat on the breadth or
vigor of this exceptionalist shield for the exercise of government sovereignty. 143 The author has
argued against any conclusion that Winstar or its progeny have significantly reduced the scope or
vigor of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine and the related Unmistakability Doctrine.144 But even if
that is adjuged otherwise, these cases arise in a civilian contexts and typically involve the use of
contracts as a primary or a supplemental means of regulating private economic activity.145 It is
plain that the courts deciding these cases did not perceive that important sovereign prerogatives
were at stake in these cases; the contexts were markedly different from the military procurement
settings, and related contexts in which sovereignty has been perceived as vitally threatened by the
courts. Accordingly, the strength of exceptionalist policies may have waned when the strong
implications for sovereignty typically recognized in military procurement contexts – and in some
143
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other contexts in which strong contractual rights would have threatened key prerogatives of
sovereignty– were absent.

4. The deferential standard of review in judicial bid protests
Another compelling illustration of the contribution of military procurement contexts to
exceptionalism in the United States law of government contracts can be seen in the cases and
statutes that embody the deferential standard of review applicable to bid protest cases. This
deferential standard was discussed above, in connection with the Steinthalcase, involving bid
protest jurisdiction in the United States District Courts.146 Steinthal itself arose out of
procurement for parachutes by the Air Force.147 And the policies articulated by the court as
reasons for the deferential standard of review reflect the very policy considerations that typically
drive the exceptionalist doctrines noted in this Article: the technical nature of the procurement
policy issues, the technical complexity of the relevant body of law, and the superior expertise of
procurement officials and the General Accounting Office that all called for deference to the
agency’s judgment.148 In subsequent years this deferential standard, was codified, and is
codification gave explicit recognition to the special need for extra deference in the military
procurement context. The statutory standard of review for judicial bid protests now provides in
pertinent part: “In exercising [bid protest] jurisdiction under this subsection, the courts shall give
146
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due regard to the interests of national defense and national security and the need for expeditious
resolution of the action.”149 The dramatic impact of military procurement in shaping an
exceptionalist body of law could not be more explicit. Still, equally telling is the fact that the
deferential standard of review for judicial bid protest cases, as it was interpreted in Steinthal, a
military procurement case, was carried over to civilian procurement, and was also codified, thus
spreading the impact of the exceptionalism flowing from the military template for the United
States’ procurement law regime.150

5. Other Examples of Military-Derived Exceptionalism
Part II of this paper introduces a host of additional examples of exceptionalism that are
fairly clearly traceable to the impact of military procurement. Were space no object, each of
these could be explored in detail. But the examples explored more carefully above should be
entirely sufficient to establish the theory advocated here: that the centrality of military
procurement in the development of the United States’ procurement law regime was a powerful
engine for the development of the exceptionalist approach so evident in that regime. Still, it is
appropriate briefly to list here other exceptionalist doctrines whose content and development
appear to reflect the impact of military procurement:
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•

the doctrine of strict compliance; 151

•

the government’s right to terminate for default where no performance deadline has yet
been missed, simply because ultimate performance has been endangered;

•

the broad authority of federal government contracting officers to impose unilateral change
orders that substantial increase, reduce or alter the contractor’s obligations of
performance under a federal government contract; 152

•

the development of competitive negotiation procedures as an alternative to sealed bidding
as a means of securing full and open competition, the importance of which is most
evident in military procurement settings; 153 and

•

the development of cost-reimbursement contracting as an alternative to firm-fixed price
contracts because the need to shift the risk of uncertainty as to the cost of performance to
151

See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Note that Arrow Lacquer, cited there, arose
from military procurement. The facts of that case arguably suggest an abuse of discretion by the
government in a context in it appears at first blush that a non-material performance defect could
not possibly have had any significance. But performance disputes tribunals undoubtedly and
understandably are loathe in the extreme ever to be put in the position of deciding whether a
performance failure in a military context is material.
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See supra TAN 13 and authorities cited therein. The policies that underlie the broad
termination for convenience doctrine developed in the context of military procurement are
equally applicable here. See TAN notes 95-98 and accompanying notes. Indeed, analytically, a
termination for convenience is just an extreme unilateral change; and a partial termination for
convenience is indistinguishable from a change order. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the
policies that lie behind these two exceptionalist doctrines are essentially identical. Corliss SteamEngine Co. explains precisely why military procurement contracts are especially likely to give
rise to change orders. See supra TAN 96.
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the government is greatest in connection with contracts for cutting edge performances that
push the envelope of available technology.154

We close with one final example of exceptionalism that is explicitly and clearly tied to
the context of military procurement: the “government contractor defense” recognized in Boyle v.
United TechnologiesCorp.155 As indicated above, the emergence of that exceptionalist doctrine
is explicitly tied by the Court to the considerations applicable to its military procurement
context.156

IV. Conclusions, Recommendations for Further Study and Policy Prescriptions
This Article has undertaken to define more rigorously the phenomenon of exceptionalism
in public procurement law, and to study the incidence of this phenomenon in the federal
government contracts law of the United States. It has also sought an explanation for the strong
exceptionalist tendency found in United States public contract law, particularly in the law of
government contract performance. It has also examined the prominent role – especially
noteworthy when viewed through the lens of comparative public procurement law – that military
procurement has played in the development of the legal regime for public procurement in the
United States. And it has tested the explanation that including military procurement at the
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center of the public procurement system in the United States has been a major cause of the
emergence of this exceptionalist character in the government contracts law of the United States.
Although the reader will have to draw her own conclusions as to the strength of the evidence
marshaled here, the two basic theses of this Article were supported by the historical and doctrinal
survey and analysis that is offered here.
First, the incidence of exceptionalism is dramatically skewed when United States public
procurement law is viewed as a whole; it is highly concentrated in the doctrines that govern
public contract performance and associated disputes. United States law of public contract
formation is, instead, mostly a blend of 1) reverse exceptionalism that imposes special duties on
federal agencies engaged in procurement that exceed any counterpart doctrines applicable to
private parties purchasing goods or services in the commercial marketplace, and 2) significant
elements of congruence, as to which the requirements of public contract formation parallel or
approximate those borne by private contracting parties.157 Although there are certainly
significant exceptionalist doctrines that affect federal government contract formation, and yet
others that affect both formation and performance, or which transcend these categories, the main
thrust of exceptionalism is concentrated in the law of public contract performance in the United
States.
This pattern that describes the incidence of exceptionalism in United States public
contract law has particular significance for comparative law purposes. The law of government
contract performance is not treated as a co-equal part of the public procurement law, along with
157

See supra note ___ for a listing of significant elements of congruence in public contract
formation law in the United States..
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the law of government contract formation, in many other nations, including significant European
procurement law regimes. Accordingly, recognizing the concentration of exceptionalism in the
United States’ law of public contract performance, and the divergence of this body of law from
the norms of other countries is an essential precondition to accomplishing meaningful and
illuminating comparative law analysis in the field of public procurement law.
Second, the evidence appears to support the conclusion that the central role played by
military procurement in the development of the United States public procurement regime is a
primary explanation for the strongly exceptionalist character that has emerged in that system.
Many of the key exceptionalist doctrines emerged in cases involving military procurement. And
the rationales given for the exceptionalist approaches taken generally confirm that the military
context significantly influenced the exceptionalist doctrines that emerged in these cases.
Among the significant policies factors that have contributed to the exceptionalist
character of this body of law is the unusual susceptibility of military procurement contracts to
unforeseen circumstances because of the shifting fortunes and inherent unpredictabiliy of war. A
second recurring factor is the susceptibility of military procurement contracts to unforeseen
changes because of the technological sophistication and progressiveness of the goods and
services subject to procurement. It is striking that this feature of military procurement was
recognized, quite early on in United States history, in Corliss Steam-Engine Co., the seminal case
on the termination for convenience power of federal agencies engaged in procurement, which
arose from the termination of contracts caused by the end of the Civil War. A third factor of very
substantial consequence is the highly understandable but nonetheless striking reluctance of
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federal courts closely to review the decisions of military officials as to the military necessity for
particular goods or services or changes in the specifications or contract modifications or
terminations.
These factors are displayed recurrently in the leading procurement cases, and plainly
provide a major explanation for the exceptionalist approach taken to military procurement in the
United States. Moreover, because military procurement served as a template for the development
of the entire system of public procurement law in the United States, the exceptionalist model and
accompanying policies that were developed and initially justified for military purposes have now
been carried over, to a very substantial degree, though not fully, into the law regulating civilian
contracts of the United States. Indeed, in most instances and in most respects, this is a single
unified body of law today.
What this pattern most strongly suggests is that early in the political and legal history of
the United States, and early in the development of the United States public procurement law
regime, the compelling nature of the sovereign prerogatives of government was first and most
thoroughly recognized in the context of disputes arising out of military procurement. Although
this recognition has not carried over with undiminished force to the civilian context, military
procurement has served, to a significant degree, as a Trojan horse, that opened the procurement
law regime to exceptionalist doctrines that accommodate the special needs and responsibilities
borne by the government, even when it enters into the procurement market place.
This causal explanation proposed here is further corroborated by examining instances in
which congruence has played a more prominent role in United States public procurement law.
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Such cases are characteristically ones in which the compelling policy justifications for
exceptionalist approaches that have been recognized in cases involving military procurement
were simply lacking because of the absence of a military context for the procurement. As Purcell
Envelope demonstrates, this differential approach is of long standing. On the other hand, as
noted above, because military procurement-based doctrines have now crossed over to apply in
non-military procurement settings, and a largely unified body of procurement law has been
fostered by federal statutes and regulations, the disparity has disappeared in many contexts.
Nonetheless, it may not be entirely gone. For instance, the Supreme Court has in recent years
shifted to a somewhat more congruence-oriented posture regarding federal government contracts,
especially with respect to the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines.158 The civilian and
regulatory context of the contracts involved in such cases is markedly different than that of the
cases that produced these paradigmatic exceptionalist doctrines and that disparity in context
likely explains the Court’s recent drift in the direction of congruence in these cases. Moreover,
because of the unification of regulation of federal public contracts in the post-World War II era,
there is a risk that this more congruence-oriented approach will be carried over, inappropriately
perhaps, to contexts in which sovereign prerogatives deserve more protection and demand
exceptionalist treatment. These may in fact include military procurement cases. On the other
hand, although it is far too soon to render any firm judgments on these matters, the terrorist
attacks on the United States of 9/11/2001, as well as the Iraq War and ensuing occupation of
2003-2004, have created opportunities to re-dramatize the important prerogatives of sovereignty
158
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that are implicated by public contracting. Although this is largely a subject for another article,
contract disputes and procurement policy controversies emerging from the Iraq War and
subsequent occupation have highlighted both the grounds for, and the potential abuses associated
with, exceptionalism in the law of federal public contracting.
This Article has also identified important opportunities for further research in a
comparative law vein, designed to explore further and test in other contexts the theses presented
here. Of particular importance would be studies that employ the constructs of exceptionalism
and congruence employed here to explore the development of public procurement law in a
variety of other nations, including developing nations, and those with transitional economies
emerging from a legacy of socialism that are developing or seeking to develop competitive,
transparent public procurement law regimes. Such comparative law work would also offer an
important opportunity to test the second thesis of this Article: that the military procurement
template that was the basis for much of the development of the United States public procurement
law regime has been a primary cause of the strong exceptionalist strain in the public procurement
law of the United States.159
159

As noted above, note ___, this study does not examine the body of state (or local)
public procurement law that is in force in the various States of the United States. Because state
and local governments do not have military functions, an extension of the exceptionalism and
congruence constructs to the study of state and local public procurement law in the United States
also has potential to shed additional light on the strength of the argument made here concerning
the impact of military procurement on the exceptionalist character of United States public
procurement law.
Such additional study would necessarily be time consuming because of the formal
independence of each of the States’ public procurement regimes and the possible diversity of
practices among the states in this regard. But such additional study would be particularly
valuable as it would help to ferret out the presence, or absence, of other factors unique to the
United States legal context, that might explain divergence of United States federal public
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Finally, the argument advanced here has important implications for public policy
regarding the design of public procurement regimes world wide. In particular, it has lessons for
developing nations and transitional economies first seeking to develop an open, competitive, and
transparent public procurement law system. The author has sought, in previous work, as well as
in this Article above, to identify the important advantages that exceptionalist doctrines of public
procurement law, especially in the law of government contract performance, confer on a nation
and its procurement system.160 The responsibilities and duties of the sovereign indeed compel us
to devise a body of public contract law that balances the special needs of the government with the
protection of the expectations and interests of government contractors. Because the military
procurement context has served to highlight these considerations, as it served as the template for
the development of the procurement regime in the United States, it cast that system in an
exceptionalist mold. The author concludes that the impact on the development of the
procurement law regime in the United States has been a beneficial one, fostering doctrines that
engendered a desirable and appropriate flexibility for the sovereign engaged in procurement,

contract law from tendencies that are dominant elsewhere in the world.
If state and local public procurement law in the United States generally lacks the
exceptionalist character of federal public procurement law, that would provide additional
evidence to support the argument made here. On the other hand, if it were to emerge that state
and local public procurement law in the United States tends to share fully the exceptionalist
character of the federal model, the question that would then have to be addressed is whether this
similarity reflects a) the influence of the federal model on development of state and local
procurement law in the United States, or b) the presence of other factors (not addressed in this
study) in the United States legal environment that predispose United States public procurement
law systems to the exceptionalist approach.
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while finding appropriate devices to protect the key interests of government contractors and
would-be contractors.
Military procurement has performed this important catalytic role in the development of
exceptionalist public procurement law doctrine in the United States. Nonetheless, concerns
about security, flexibility, and nationalistic/protectionist interests have discouraged many nations
developing their own procurement law regimes in recent times from regulating military and
security-related public procurement under the umbrella of an open, competitive and transparent
procurement law regime. The same is true of the major international instruments that attempt to
establish regional or world open public procurement markets, such as the European Union
treaties and Directives and the Government Procurement Agreement of the World Trade
Organization. Nevertheless, if military procurement played so important a role in catalyzing the
emergence of an appropriately exceptionalist public procurement law regime in the United
States, as is claimed here, there may be substantial adverse consequences when military
procurement is not engrossed emerging national and international public procurement regulatory
regimes. In light of the findings of this Article, these hidden spillover costs of excluding most
military procurement from the reach of developing and established public procurement regulatory
regimes should no longer be overlooked. The widespread acceptance of such commonlyaccepted exclusions should be reconsidered.

